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Abstract
We study how personalized news aggregation for rational inattentive voters (NARI)
affects policy polarization and public opinion. In a two-candidate electoral competition
model, an attention-maximizing infomediary aggregates information about candidates’
valence into news. Voters decide whether to consume news, trading off the expected
utility gain from improved expressive voting against the attention cost. NARI generates
policy polarization even if candidates are office-motivated. Personalized news serves
extreme voters with skewed signals and makes them the disciplining entities of policy
polarization. Analysis of disciplining voters sheds light on the political effects of recent
regulatory proposals to tame the tech giants.
Keywords: news aggregation for rational inattentive voters, electoral competition, policy
polarization, public opinion
JEL codes: D72, D80, L10
∗Research School of Finance, Actuarial Studies and Statistics, Australian National University,
lin.hu@anu.edu.au.
†Department of Economics, Washington University in St. Louis, anqili@wustl.edu.
‡Department of Economics, Stanford University, isegal@stanford.edu.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
91
0.
11
40
5v
6 
 [e
co
n.G
N]
  2
2 J
ul 
20
20
1 Introduction
Recently, the idea that tech-enabled news personalization could affect political polarization
has been put forward in the academia and popular press (Sunstein (2009); Pariser (2011);
Gentzkow (2016); Obama (2017); Barbera (2020)). This paper studies how personalized
news aggregation for rational inattentive voters affects policy polarization and public opinion
in an electoral competition model.
Our premise is that rational demand for news aggregation in the digital era is driven by
information processing costs. As more people get news online where the amount of available
information (2.5 quintillion bytes) is vastly greater than what any individual can process
in a lifetime, consumers must turn to infomediaries for news aggregation, personalized
based on their individual data such as demographic and psychographic attributes, digital
footprints, social network positions, etc.1 In this paper, we abstract from the issue of
information generation (e.g., original reporting), focusing instead on the role of infomediaries
in aggregating available information into news that is easy to process and useful for the
target audience.
We develop a model of news aggregation for rational inattentive consumers (here-
after NARI), in which an infomediary can flexibly aggregate source data into news using
algorithm-driven systems. While flexibility is also assumed in the Rational Inattention
model pioneered by Sims (1998) and Sims (2003) (hereafter RI), in that model consumers
can aggregate information optimally themselves and so have no need for external aggre-
gators. To model the demand for news aggregation, we assume that consumers can only
choose whether to absorb the news offered to them but cannot digest news partially or
1News aggregators (e.g., aggregator sites, social media feeds, mobile news apps) operate by sifting through
myriad online sources and directing readers to the stories they might find interesting. They have recently
gained prominence as more people get news online, from social media and through mobile devices (Matsa and
Lu (2016)). The top three popular news websites in 2019: Yahoo! News, Google News and Huffington Post,
are all aggregators. The role of social media feeds in the 2016 U.S. presidential election remains subject of
hotly debate (Allcott and Gentzkow (2017)). See Athey and Mobius (2012), Athey, Mobius, and Pal (2017)
and Chiou and Tucker (2017) for background readings and literature surveys.
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selectively,2 or aggregate information from sources themselves.3 While this assumption is
certainly stylized, it is, in our view, the simplest one that creates a role for news aggrega-
tors.4
If choosing to consume news, a consumer incurs an attention cost that is posterior sep-
arable (Caplin and Dean (2013); Caplin, Dean, and Leahy (2019)) while deriving utilities
from improved decision-making. News consumption is optimal if the expected utility gain
exceeds the attention cost. As for the infomediary, we assume that its goal is to maximize
the total amount of attention paid by consumers, interpreted as the advertising revenue gen-
erated from consumer eyeballs.5 This stylized assumption captures the key trade-off faced
by the infomediary, who uses useful and easy-to-process information to attract consumers’
attention and to prevent them from tuning out. We focus on the case of a monopolis-
tic infomediary in order to capture the power wielded by tech giants, yet also investigate
an extension to perfectly competitive infomediaries which, together with personalization,
becomes equivalent to consumers optimally aggregating information themselves as in the
standard RI model.
We embed the NARI model into an electoral competition game in which two candidates
compete for office by choosing policies on a left-right spectrum. Voters vote expressively
based on policies, as well as an uncertain valence state about candidates’ fitness for office.
News about the valence state is designed by an infomediary, who moves simultaneously with
candidates. Voters make news consumption decisions before they observe policies and then
cast votes.
2Analyses of page activities (e.g., scrolling, viewport time) have established significant levels of user
attention and engagement in online news reading (Lagun and Lalmas (2016); Mitchell, Stocking, and Matsa
(2016)). Snippets (headlines plus excerpts) also contain substantial information despite that they do not
always materialize into click-throughs (Dellarocas et al. (2016)).
3According to the studies cited in Footnote 1, aggregators reduce search costs and broaden readers’ scopes
compared to direct browsing and web-based searches.
4The difference between the RI model and standard media models is first noted by Stro¨mberg (2015), who
postulates that “in the RI model, information is assumed available, and voters choose what information to pay
attention to given their cognitive constraints. In our (media) model, the media chooses what information is
most profitable to make available to voters, while voters have no cognitive constraints. Adding voter rational
inattention to media models may reduce information levels and differences in coverage across issues.” Our
NARI model differs from both the RI model and standard media models, in that our voters must fully absorb
the information given to them by paying costly attention.
5Section 2.2 details the business model of modern news aggregators.
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A consequence of NARI is that the infomediary gives binary recommendations as to
which candidate one should vote for. Indeed, any information beyond voting recommenda-
tions would only raise the attention cost without any corresponding benefit and would thus
turn away news consumers whose participation constraints bind at the optimum. Further-
more, news consumers must strictly prefer to obey the recommendations given to them—a
property we refer to as strict obedience. Indeed, a voter who is indifferent about following
the voting recommendation must have a weakly preferred candidate that is independent of
the recommendation and would thus abstain from news consumption to save the attention
cost.
An important implication of strict obedience is that local deviations from a symmetric
policy profile wouldn’t change voters’ votes for either recommendation they may receive,
suggesting that policy divergence could arise in equilibrium even if candidates are office-
motivated. We define policy polarization as the maximal distance between candidates’
positions among all symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibria. In the baseline model with
three types of voters, our main theorem shows that if strict obedience holds for every feasible
policy profile (hereafter uniform strict obedience), then policy polarization is strictly positive
and equals the disciplining voter’s policy latitude.
We define a voter’s policy latitude as the maximum policy such that even if a candidate
deviates unilaterally from the corresponding symmetric policy profile to the voter’s most
preferred position, he still cannot attract the voter, i.e., win the voter’s support even if
news is unfavorable to his fitness. Policy latitude captures a voter’s resistance to policy
deviations, which decreases with his preference for the the deviating candidate’s policies
and increases with his pessimism about the latter’s fitness following unfavorable news. It is
shown to be well-defined and strictly positive mainly due to uniform strict obedience.
A voter is disciplining if his policy latitude determines policy polarization. To pin down
disciplining voters, we compare the case of broadcast news, in which the infomediary (e.g.,
commercial TV) must offer a single news signal to all voters, to the case of personalized
news, in which the infomediary (e.g., Google News) can design different news signals for
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different voters. In the broadcast case, all voters receive the same voting recommendation,
so a candidate’s deviation is profitable, i.e., strictly increase his winning probability, if and
only if it attracts a majority of voters. Under the usual assumptions, this is equivalent
to attracting median voters, who are therefore disciplining. In the personalized case, the
infomediary can provide conditionally independent signals to different types of voters (this
assumption will be relaxed), so each type of voter is pivotal with a positive probability when
voters’ population distribution is sufficient dispersed. In that case, a deviation is shown to
be profitable if and only if it attracts any type of voter, so voters with the smallest policy
are disciplining because they are the easiest to attract.
We examine factors that affect the identities and policy latitudes of disciplining voters.
Our first comparative statics result concerns the transition from broadcast news to person-
alized news, the reverse of which is an integral part of Senator Elizabeth Warren’s proposal
to tame the tech giants (Warren (2019)) and is a possible result of implementing the General
Data Protection Regulation among EU citizens.6 As argued above, candidates face more
deviating opportunities in the personalized case than in the broadcast case, which makes
policy polarization harder to sustain. However, there is a countervailing effect stemming
from the skewness of news signals. In the broadcast case, the infomediary uses a symmet-
ric signal to attract a broad and balanced audience. In contrast, the optimal personalized
signals for extreme voters are skewed: to maximize usefulness, the recommendation to vote
across party lines must be sufficiently strong and, hence, must also be sufficiently rare
in order to contain the attention cost; most of the time, the recommendation is to vote
along party lines, which by Bayes’ rule can only shift the voter’s belief moderately. Taken
together, the optimal personalized signal exhibits both the own-party bias (Fiorina and
Abrams (2008); Gentzkow (2016)) and occasional big surprise (Chiang and Knight (2011);
Flaxman, Goel, and Rao (2016)) that have been documented in the empirical literature.
If extreme voters are disciplining in the personalized case, then the skewness of their
6In early 2019, Senator Elizabeth Warren called for the big tech companies to be broken up and to meet
the standard of nondiscriminatory dealing with customers. The General Data Protection Regulation was
created in 2016 to uphold the protection of personally identifiable information of EU citizens.
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personalized news signals is crucial for sustaining greater policy polarization than in the
broadcast case. First, the occasional big surprise makes the base voters of a deviating
candidate difficult to attract in the rare event where their news signal recommends the
opposing candidate. Indeed, such a recommendation can be so strong that even the most
attractive deviation to base voters cannot change their voting decisions. In that case,
equilibrium polarization is constrained by the deviation to attract opposition voters, who
have an intrinsic preference against the deviating candidate’s policies and therefore a big
policy latitude. For these reasons, equilibrium could be more polarized than in the broadcast
case, and we give condition for this to be true when the attention cost is Shannon entropy-
based.
Our second comparative statics result concerns introducing competition between infome-
diaries, which is advocated by the British government as a preferable way of regulating tech
giants (The Digital Competition Expert Panel (2019)) and is shown to be mathematically
equivalent to increasing voters’ marginal attention cost in the monopolistic personalized
case. Its policy polarization effect is negative, because policy latitudes decrease with the
informativeness of voters’ news signals.
Our third comparative statics result concerns increasing mass polarization, modeled
as as a mean-preserving spread to voters’ policy preferences (Fiorina and Abrams (2008);
Gentzkow (2016)). Contrary to popular belief, its policy polarization effect could be negative
in the case of personalized news, because when voters’ population distribution is sufficiently
dispersed, policy polarization is determined by the minimal policy latitude among all voters
rather than median voters’ policy latitude alone.
In Appendix A, we extend the baseline model to arbitrary finite types of voters and allow
the infomediary to correlate personalized news signals across voters. We develop a method-
ology for analyzing this general model and demonstrate, in particular, that correlation can
only increase policy polarization. Based on this result, we evaluate the consequence of build-
ing news aggregators that provide users with neutral viewpoints (see, e.g., Allsides.com).
We find that a large-scale use of such aggregators would keep the marginal news distribution
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the same as that in the broadcast case but relax the assumption that news signals must be
perfectly correlated among voters, so its policy polarization effect is negative.
1.1 Related literature
Rational inattention The literature on rational inattention assumes the existence of
a costly communication channel that aggregates source data into the optimal signal for
decision-making. To create a role for news aggregators, we assume that communication
channels are designed by an attention-maximizing infomediary rather than voters them-
selves, whereas voters must fully absorb the information given to them. Apart from this
major departure from the RI paradigm, we otherwise follow the standard model of posterior-
separable attention cost that nests Shannon entropy as a special case. Posterior separability
(Caplin and Dean (2013); Caplin, Dean, and Leahy (2019)) has recently received attention
from economists because of its axiomatic and revealed-preference foundations (Caplin and
Dean (2015); Zhong (2017); Denti (2018); Tsakas (2019)), connections to sequential learning
(He´bert and Woodford (2017); Morris and Strack (2017)), and validations by lab experi-
ments (Ambuehl, Ockenfels, and Stewart (2019); Dean and Nelighz (2019)).
Mateˇjka and Tabellini (2016) pioneer the study of electoral competition with rational
inattentive voters. In their model, voters face normal uncertainties about candidates’ poli-
cies, and the cost of information acquisition (in the form of variance reduction) can differ
across candidates. The last assumption generates policy divergence by allowing candidates
to target voters who pay different levels of attention and in turn exert different influences on
the electoral outcome. Our model differs from Mateˇjka and Tabellini (2016) in the source
of uncertainty, the attention technology, and the reason behind policy divergence.
Media bias The literature on media bias is thoroughly surveyed by Prat and Stro¨mberg
(2013), Stro¨mberg (2015), and Anderson, Stro¨mberg, and Waldfogel (2016). We add to
the theoretical literature on demand-driven media bias, whose common explanations in-
clude limited information processing capacity, behavioral bias (Mullainathan and Shleifer
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(2005)), and reputational concern (Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006)). The idea that rational
consumers can exhibit a preference for biased news when constrained by information pro-
cessing capacities dates back to Calvert (1985a) and is later expanded on by Suen (2004),
Burke (2008), and Che and Mierendorff (2019). While some of these models generate both
own-party bias and occasional big surprise, they consider different information aggregation
technologies from ours and do not examine the consequence of news bias for electoral com-
petition. As we will argue in the discussion of Chan and Suen (2008), different choices
of information aggregation technologies have different impacts for the outcome of electoral
competition.
Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) pioneer the idea that people derive psychological utili-
ties from hearing consistent views to their prior beliefs. Their non-Bayesian model predicts
a confirmatory bias but not any occasional big surprise. In political science, own-party bias,
or party sorting, refers to the positive correlation between a person’s party affiliation and
his propensity to support his own-party candidate. The past decade has witnessed a rise
in party sorting but little change in voters’ policy preferences (Fiorina and Abrams (2008);
Gentzkow (2016)). Our finding suggests that this trend could persist due to personalized
news aggregation.
Evidence for occasional big surprise and, more generally, Bayesian news consumers is
surveyed by DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010). In the context of online news consumption,
Flaxman, Goel, and Rao (2016) find that use of aggregators increases one’s propensity to
support his own-party candidate (i.e., own-party bias), as well as his opinion intensity when
he does support his opposite-party candidate (i.e., occasional big surprise). Chiang and
Knight (2011) provides a famous account for occasional big surprise in a more conventional
setting, showing that endorsements of presidential candidates that go against the bias of a
newspaper are the most effective in shaping voters’ voting decisions.
Policy divergence in electoral competition models In most existing probabilistic
voting models, voters’ signals are taken to be continuously distributed, so even an arbitrarily
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small change in a candidate’s position could affect voters’ voting decisions.7 Under this
assumption (and symmetry, as in our model), Calvert (1985b) famously establishes policy
convergence between office-seeking candidates, and pioneers the use of policy preference
for generating policy divergence. Uniform strict obedience stands in stark contrast to this
assumption, though it is a natural consequence of NARI.
Electoral competition with flexible and profit-maximizing information aggrega-
tor Stro¨mberg (2004) and Chan and Suen (2008) study electoral competition with flexible
and profit-maximizing information aggregators, though their models and predictions differ
completely from ours.8 Stro¨mberg (2004) assumes that the probability a government pro-
gram is read by voters increases with its press coverage, and newspapers allocate limited
spaces between multiple programs based on readers’ revenue potentials. His research ques-
tion concerns how newspaper reporting affects government budget allocation rather than
platform convergence or divergence.
Chan and Suen (2008) study a similar research question to ours. In their model, voters
care about whether the realization of a random state variable is above or below their personal
thresholds, and media outlets partition state realizations using fixed threshold rules. A
consequence of working with this information aggregation technology, rather than NARI,
is that signal realizations are monotone in voters’ thresholds (i.e., if a left-leaning voter
is recommended to vote for candidate R, then a right-leaning voter must receive the same
recommendation), and so median voters are always disciplining despite a plurality of media.
In our model, extreme voters can be disciplining in the case of personalized news. Moreover,
policy divergence stems from uniform strict obedience, whereas in Chan and Suen (2008)’s
setting, it follows from the standard logic of the Calvert-Wittman model.9
7See Duggan (2017) for a survey of probabilistic voting models.
8Assuming non-RI information aggregation technologies and fixed policy platforms, Duggan and Mar-
tinelli (2011) and Prat (2018) study political models in which the media’s goal is to persuade voters with
limited information processing capacities, whereas Perego and Yuksel (2018) examine how media entry affects
opinion disagreement among news consumers.
9Chan and Suen (2008) assume that voters privately observe an aggregate preference shock in addition
to the voting recommendations given by media outlets, and candidates have policy preferences. We do not
make any of these assumptions.
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The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 introduces the baseline
model; Sections 3 and 4 characterize equilibrium outcomes; Section 5 conducts comparative
statics analyses; Section 6 investigates extensions of the baseline model; Section 7 concludes.
Additional materials and mathematical proofs can be found in Appendices A-E.
2 Baseline model
2.1 Setup
Political players Two office-seeking candidates named L and R can adopt the policies
in a compact interval A = [−a, a], where a > 0. They face a unit mass of infinitesimal
voters who are left-wing (k = −1), centrist (k = 0) or right-wing (k = 1). Each type
k ∈ K = {−1, 0, 1} of voter has a population q (k) and values a policy a ∈ A by u (a, k) =
−|t (k)−a|. The population function q : K → R++ has support K and is symmetric around
zero, whereas the bliss point function t : K → int (A) is strictly increasing and satisfies
t (−k) = −t (k) for any k ∈ K.
Voting Voting is expressive. For any given policy profile a = 〈aL, aR〉 ∈ A2, a type k
voter earns the following utility difference from voting for candidate R rather than L:
v (a, k) + ω.
In the above expression,
v (a, k) = u (aR, k)− u (aL, k)
captures the voter’s differential valuation of candidates’ policies, whereas ω is an uncertain
state about which candidate is more fit for office (hereafter the valence state).10 In the
10E.g., in the ongoing debate about the most effective measure to battle terrorism, ω = −1 if the state
favors the use of soft power such as diplomatic tactics, and ω = 1 if the state favors the use of hard power
such as military preemption. Candidate L and R are more experienced with the use of soft power and hard
power, respectively, and whoever holding the experience that matches the true state enjoys an advantage
over his opponent.
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baseline model, ω takes the values in Ω = {−1, 1} with equal probability, so its prior mean
equals zero.
News A news signal is a finite signal structure Π : Ω → ∆ (Z), where each Π (· | ω)
specifies a probability distribution over a finite set Z of signal realizations conditional on
the state realization being ω ∈ Ω.
News is provided by a monopolistic infomediary who is equipped with a personalization
technology S. S is a partition of voters’ types, and each cell of it is called a market segment.
The infomediary can distinguish between voters of different market segments but not those
within the same market segment. Our focus will be on the coarsest and finest partitions
named the broadcast technology b = {K} and personalized technology p = {{k} : k ∈ K},
respectively. The broadcast technology cannot distinguish between different types of voters,
whereas the personalized technology does so perfectly.
Under personalization technology S ∈ {b, p}, the infomediary designs |S| news signals,
one for each market segment. Within each market segment, voters decide whether to con-
sume the signal that is offered to them. Consuming signal Π requires that voters fully
absorb its information content. Doing so incurs an attention cost λ · I (Π), where λ > 0 is a
scaling parameter called the marginal attention cost, and I (Π) is the needed attention for
absorbing Π. After consuming news, voters observe the signal realization, update beliefs
about the state, and vote expressively. The infomediary’s profit equals the total amount of
attention paid by voters.
Game The game sequence is as follows.
1. The infomediary designs news signal structures. Voters observe the news signal struc-
tures offered to them and make consumption decisions accordingly.
2. Candidates choose policies without observing news signal structures or news consump-
tion decisions.
3. The state is realized.
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4. Voters observe policies and news realizations and vote. The winner of the election is
determined by simple majority rule with even tie-breaking.
The solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (hereafter equilibrium). Our goal is
to characterize all equilibria in which candidates propose symmetric policy profiles of form
〈−a, a〉, a ≥ 0 in stage 2 of the game.
2.2 Model discussions
Valence state We take the source data (e.g., original reporting) as given and model them
as a random state variable. The assumption of binary states is meant to ease exposition,
and it will be relaxed in Appendix C.
News signal A signal structure aggregates source data into news. Under signal structure
Π : Ω→ ∆ (Z),
piz =
∑
ω∈Ω
Π (z | ω) · 1
2
is the probability that the signal realization is z ∈ Z. Assume without loss of generality
(w.l.o.g.) that piz > 0 for any z ∈ Z. Then
µz =
∑
ω∈Ω
ω ·Π (z | ω) / (2piz)
is the posterior mean of the state conditional on the signal realization being z ∈ Z. Since
the state is binary, µz fully captures one’s posterior belief about the state given signal
realization z.
Attention cost We use a single parameter λ > 0 to capture factors that affect voters’
(opportunity) cost of paying attention, e.g., distractions coming from the Internet and mo-
bile devices (Dunaway (2016)), increasing competition between firms for consumer eyeballs
(Teixeira (2014)), etc. We restrict λ to be constant across voters for now and will relax this
assumption in Section 6.3.
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Assumption 1. The needed attention for consuming Π : Ω→ ∆ (Z) equals
I (Π) =
∑
z∈Z
piz · h (µz) , (1)
where the function h : [−1, 1] → R+ (i) is strictly convex and satisfies h (0) = 0, (ii) is
continuous on [−1, 1] and twice differentiable on (−1, 1), and (iii) is symmetric around
zero.
Assumption 1 defines attention as a scarce resource that reduces voter’s uncertainty
about the valence state before and after news consumption. Equation (1) coupled with
Assumption 1(i) is equivalent to the notion of weak posterior separability, which was pro-
posed by Caplin and Dean (2013) to generalize Shannon’s entropy cost as a measure of
attention cost.11 In the current context, weak posterior separability stipulates that the
needed attention for consuming news must equal zero if the news signal is null, and it must
increase as voter’s posterior belief moves closer to the true state and as the news signal
becomes more Blackwell informative. Assumption 1(ii) and (iii) impose regularities on our
problem. Assumption 1(iii) is stronger than necessary, stipulating that only the magnitude
of posterior mean could affect the needed attention for news consumption, whereas its sign
(which indicates the direction of belief updating) couldn’t. Relaxing this assumption won’t
affect most of our results.12
Assumption 1 is satisfied by many commonly used attention functions. While most
upcoming analysis won’t make functional form assumptions about h, it is still useful to
11Various foundations for the use of posterior-separable attention functions have been proposed since
Shannon (1948). For the case where h is the binary entropy function, imagine a voter can ask a series of
yes-or-no questions about the valence state at a constant marginal cost. The more questions the voter asks,
the more precise his posterior belief is about the true state. According to Shannon (1948), the minimal
average number of questions that needs to be asked in order to implement a news signal structure equals
approximately the mutual information between source data and output signal.
More recently, He´bert and Woodford (2017) and Morris and Strack (2017) investigate optimal stopping
problems in which a decision maker consults each of the many sources one at a time and incurs a (time
and belief-dependent) flow cost until the process is randomly terminated. These authors provide general
conditions under which the expected total cost is posterior separable in the continuous-time limit.
12For these results to hold, all we need is that the function h (·, k) (parameterized by voter’s type k) is
symmetric between symmetric types of voters, i.e., h (µ, k) = h (−µ,−k) for any µ and k. Theorem 1 and
its corollaries will be affected in general but not when the departure from Assumption 1(iii) is small.
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keep in mind two special cases: (i) h (µ) = µ2 and (ii) h (µ) = H ((1 + µ) /2) with H =
binary entropy function, in which I (Π) equal the reductions in the variance and Shannon
entropy of the valence state, respectively, before and after news consumption.
Costly expressive voting We share the same view as Prat and Stro¨mberg (2013) that
instrumental voting is an important motive for consuming political news. Our voters trade
off the expected utility gain from improved expressive voting against the cost of news
consumption, just like their counterparts in Stro¨mberg (2004) and Mateˇjka and Tabellini
(2016). In Bernhardt, Krasa, and Polborn (2008), voters derive both psychological utilities
and expressive voting utilities from spending valuable time on listening to news. In Section
6.2, we discuss the possibility of accommodating alternative motives for news consumption
(e.g., entertainment) into our model.
Attention-driven business model Voters encounter ads when they go through con-
tents, which generate revenues to the infomediary.13 Aside from the fixed operating cost
(which we do not explicitly model), the main expenditure stems from the arrangements
between sources, which range from no payment (e.g., Google News), a lump-sum payment
(e.g., Yahoo! News), to revenue sharing (e.g., Facebook News Feed). To capture these
institutional details, we assume that ad revenue is increasing in voter’s attention. This is
reasonable, because the more informational content a voter absorbs, the longer he stays on
the infomediary’s platform (for reasons discussed in Footnote 11) and is therefore exposed
to more ads.14 While we equate the gross profit generated by a voter to his attention,
we could apply any strictly increasing transformation to this gross profit function without
affecting any of our qualitative predictions.
13Click here for Facebook’s tactics on how to play mid-roll ads when users are already in the “lean-back”
reading mode.
14Most news aggregators display ads on their platforms. An exception is Google News, which displays zero
ads and instead refers readers to source webpages as well as the main Google search engine where Google
ads are displayed.
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Personalization technology We model the personalization technology as a partition of
voters’ types and use its fineness to capture the degree of personalization. Studying the
transition from broadcast technology to personalized technology (b→ p) is useful for three
reasons. First, if one interprets the broadcast technology as being adopted by traditional
media outlets, say, commercial TV, then studying b → p yields insights into how techno-
logical advances affect political outcomes.15 Second, if one is interested in the consequence
of banning personalization (as part of recent regulatory proposals to tame the tech giants),
then studying the reverse transition p → b would be a natural starting point. Third, once
we understand how the two basic technologies work, we can immediately extend the analy-
sis to other technologies. In Section 6.1, we briefly discuss the consequence of dividing the
single type of voters into multiple subgroups (the formal analysis is relegated to Appendix
B). In Section 6.3, we consider partitions that are finer than the broadcast technology but
are coarser than the personalized technology.
Game sequence Our game sequence is meant to capture some realities while keeping
our analysis as simple as possible. Here we comment on two assumptions we make, which
are both stylized. Our first assumption says candidates’ policies only become observable to
other players at the voting stage. We do not explicitly model the activities that make this
happen (e.g., political advertising, canvassing, debates) but note that they typically take
place right before the election day.16 Given this, it is reasonable to assume that the design
of news signals (which aggregates the evolving state of the world into breaking news) and
the decision on whether to consume news are made without observing candidates’ policies.
Our second assumption says that candidates do not observe news signal structures when
they craft policies. Here we are motivated by the reality that the algorithms behind modern
15The above described attention-driven business model is also adopted by commercial TV, whose main
revenue source is advertising and whose programs are curated to attract viewers with the highest ad-revenue
potentials (Hamilton (2004)). In our view, one of the biggest differences between commercial TV and modern
aggregators lies in the ability to provide personalized contents.
16Many countries including Canada, France and Japan and U.K. limit the lengths of political campaigns.
Even in the U.S. where such regulation is absent, the majority of election ads are aired in weeks closest to
the election day because the persuasive effects of advertising are believed to be short-lived (Gerber et al.
(2011)).
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news aggregators represent trade secrets and cannot be easily reverse-engineered by third
parties. According to computer scientists who work on algorithm audit (Eslami et al.
(2015)), the easiest way to peek into these algorithms is to survey users, which leads us to
believe that voters (at least partially) observe the news signals offered to them.
Under the above assumptions, allowing candidates to observe (signals) of the valence
state before they move won’t affect the characterization of equilibrium policies, so assuming
that candidates move before the valence state is realized is less restrictive than it seems.
3 Optimal news signals
In this section, we fix any symmetric policy profile a = 〈−a, a〉 with a ≥ 0 and solve for the
news signals that maximize the infomediary’s profit (hereafter optimal news signals). We
formalize the infomediary’s problem in Section 3.1 and characterize its solutions in Section
3.2. All results of Section 3.2 are proven for arbitrary finite types of voters with general
policy preferences in Appendix E.1.
To facilitate analysis, we say that candidate L and left-wing voters form the left-wing
party, whereas candidate R and right-wing voters form the right-wing party. Under this
definition, voters share party affiliations with the candidate whose policy position they
most prefer.
3.1 Infomediary’s problem
Under personalization technology S ∈ {b, p}, any optimal news signal for market segment
s ∈ S solves
max
Π
I (Π) · D (Π; a, s) (s)
where D (Π; a, s) denotes the demand for news signal Π in market segment s under policy
profile a. To figure out the demand for news, note that news consumption is useful for an
extreme voter if and only if it sometimes convinces him to vote across party lines. After
news consumption, a voter strictly prefers candidate R to L if v (a, k) + µz > 0, and he
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strictly prefers candidate L to R if v (a, k)+µz < 0. Ex ante, the expected utility gain from
consuming Π is
V (Π; a, k) =
∑
z∈Z
piz · ν (µz; a, k)
where
ν (µz; a, k) =

[v (a, k) + µz]
+ if k ≤ 0,
− [v (a, k) + µz]− if k > 0.
Therefore,
D (Π; a, s) =
∑
k∈K:V (Π;a,k)≥λ·I(Π)
q (k, s)
where q (k, s) denotes the population of type k voters in market segment s.
If a solution to (s) has zero demand, then it will be regarded the same as a degener-
ate signal. This rules out uninteresting situations in which the infomediary deters news
consumption using nondegenerate signals.
3.2 Main features
Binary voting recommendation and strict obedience We first demonstrate that
any optima news signal has at most two realizations and, if binary, prescribes voting rec-
ommendations its consumers strictly prefer to obey.
Formally, we say that a signal realization z endorses candidate R (resp. L) and dis-
approves candidate L (resp. R) if µz > 0 (resp. µz < 0). If a signal realization neither
endorses or disapproves any candidate, then it is neutral and will be written as z = N . For
binary signals, we write Z = {L,R}. Since Bayes’ plausibility mandates that the expected
posterior mean of the state must equal the prior mean, i.e.,
∑
z∈Z
piz · µz = 0, (BP)
it is without loss to assume that µL < 0 < µR. In this way, we can interpret each signal
realization z ∈ {L,R} as an endorsement for candidate z and a disapproval of candidate
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−z.17 In addition, we can define the concept of strict obedience as follows.
Definition 1. A binary signal with posterior means 〈µL, µR〉 induces strict obedience from
its consumers if the latter strictly prefer the endorsed candidate to the disapproved candidate
under both signal realizations, i.e.,
v (a, k) + µL < 0 < v (a, k) + µR. (SOB)
The next lemma formalizes the claim made at the beginning of this section.
Lemma 1. Under Assumption 1, the following hold for any symmetric policy profile 〈−a, a〉
with a ≥ 0.
(i) Any optimal broadcast signal has at most two realizations.
(ii) Any optimal personalized signal for any voter has at most two realizations.
(iii) Any optimal signal, if binary, induces strict obedience from its consumers.
Lemma 1 is proven differently for the cases of broadcast and personalized news. In the
personalized case, the result follows from the fact that individual voters make binary voting
decisions. Given this, any information beyond voting recommendations would only raise the
attention cost without any corresponding benefit and would thus turn away voters whose
participation constraints bind at the optimum. For these voters, maximizing attention is
equivalent to maximizing the usefulness of news consumption at the maximal attention
level.
The broadcast case is proven by aggregating voters with binding participation con-
straints into a representative voter. Under the assumption that voters’ preferences exhibit-
ing increasing differences between policies and types and all voters share the same marginal
attention cost, only extreme voters’ participation constraints can be binding, whereas cen-
17Since the state is binary, it is without loss to identify any binary signal with the posterior means 〈µL, µR〉
it induces: Π (z = R | ω = 1) = −µL(1+µR)
µR−µL and Π (z = R | ω = −1) =
−µL(1−µR)
µR−µL .
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trist voters’ participation constraint is slack.1819 Then using the concavification method de-
veloped by Aumann and Maschler (1995) and Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), we demon-
strate that the optimal personalized signal for the representative voter has at most two
realizations. The analysis exploits the assumption of binary states, which we will relax in
Section 6.2.
Strict obedience (SOB) is a consequence of rational and flexible information aggrega-
tion. Indeed, if a consumer of a binary news signal has a (weakly) preferred candidate that
is independent of the voting recommendation, then he would abstain from news consump-
tion to save attention cost without affecting his expressive voting utility, which leads to a
contradiction.
The next assumption imposes regularities on our problem.
Assumption 2. The following hold for any symmetric policy profile 〈−a, a〉 with a ≥ 0.
(i) The optimal news signal consumed by any voter under any personalization technology
is nondegenerate and, hence, is binary and satisfies (SOB).
(ii) The posterior means of the state induced by the news signal in Part (i) takes interior
values in (−1, 1).
Assumption 2 is sufficient but not necessary for our results to hold. Part (i) is satisfied
if voters’ marginal attention cost isn’t too high and their policy preferences aren’t too
extreme, and it is hereafter referred to as uniform strict obedience (because it requires that
(SOB) hold for every feasible symmetric policy profile). Part (ii) holds if the marginal
attention cost isn’t too low, and it is imposed so that we can obtain strict comparative
statics results. In Section 4.2.2, we reduce Assumption 2 to model primitives in the case of
entropy attention cost. In Section 6.2, we discuss the consequence of relaxing Assumption
2 in great detail.
Assumptions 1 and 2 together guarantee the uniqueness of optimal news signals.
18Increasing difference, formally defined as v (a, a′, k) being increasing in k for any a′ > a, means that
voters more prefer right-leaning policies to left-leaning ones as they become more pro-right.
19The assumption of constant marginal attention cost will be relaxed at the end of Section 6.
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Lemma 2. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the optimal news signal consumed by any voter is
unique for any pair of personalization technology and symmetric policy profile.
In what follows, we will use ΠS (a, k) to denote the optimal news signal consumed
by type k voters under personalization technology S and policy profile 〈−a, a〉. For each
ΠS (a, k), we will use µSz (a, k) to denote the posterior mean of the state conditional on the
signal realization being z ∈ {L,R}, and piS (a, k) to denote the probability that the signal
realization is R. In the broadcast case, we will suppress the notation of k and write Πb (a),
µbz (a) and pi
b (a) instead.
Skewness The next theorem concerns the skewness of optimal news signals.
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the following hold for any symmetric policy
profile 〈−a, a〉 with a > 0.
(i) The optimal broadcast signal is symmetric, in that it endorses each candidate with
equal probability, and the endorsements shift voters’ beliefs by the same magnitude,
i.e., pib (a) = 1/2, |µbL (a) | = µbR (a);
(ii) In the personalized case, the optimal signals are symmetric between symmetric types
of voters, i.e., |µpL (a,−k) | = µpR (a, k) for any k ∈ K. Moreover,
(a) the optimal signal for median voters is symmetric, i.e., pip (a, 0) = 1/2 and |µpL (a, 0) | =
µpR (a, 0);
(b) the optimal signal for any extreme voter is skewed, in that it endorses the voter’s
own-party candidate more often than his opposite-party candidate, although the
endorsement for the opposite-party candidate shifts the voter’s belief more signif-
icantly than the endorsement for his own-party candidate, i.e.,
– pip (a, k) < 1/2 and |µpL (a, k) | < µpR (a, k) if k < 0;
– pip (a, k) > 1/2 and |µpL (a, k) | > µpR (a, k) if k > 0.
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(iii) The optimal broadcast signal attracts less attention from any voter than his optimal
personalized signal, i.e., I
(
Πb (a)
)
< I (Πp (a, k)) for any k ∈ K.
Theorem 1(i) holds because the representative voter’s preference is symmetric in a sym-
metric environment. To develop intuition for Theorem 1(ii), recall that a binary signal is
useful for an extreme voter only if one of its recommendations convinces the voter to vote
for his opposite-party candidate. Since this signal realization moves the posterior mean of
the state far away from the prior mean, it is costly to process and must occur with a small
probability in order to contain the attention cost. Hereafter we shall refer to this signal
realization as an occasional big surprise. Most of the time, the signal endorses the voter’s
own-party candidate, although it can only shift the voter’s belief moderately by Bayes’
plausibility. We will refer to this signal realization as an own-party bias and note that it
constitutes the flip side of occasional big surprise.
We finally turn to Theorem 1(iii). As we demonstrated earlier, the optimal broadcast
signal is designed for a representative voter with a symmetric preference. Yet the news
consumption decision is made by extreme voters who prefer skewed signals to symmetric
signals. This conflict of interests limits the amount of attention the optimal broadcast signal
can attract from any voter compared to his optimal personalized signal.
4 Equilibrium policies
This section endogenizes candidates’ policy positions. Under personalization technology
S ∈ {b, p}, a news profile µ˜ and a symmetric policy profile 〈−a, a〉 with a ≥ 0 can arise in
a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if
• µ˜ is a |S|-dimensional random variable, where the marginal probability distribution
of each dimension s ∈ S solves Problem (s), taking 〈−a, a〉 as given;
• a maximizes candidate R’s winning probability, taking candidate L’s policy −a, µ˜,
voters’ news consumption decisions and their expressive voting strategies (as functions
of actual policies and news realizations) as given.
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Our goal is to characterize all perfect Bayesian equilibria of the above form. To this end,
we develop the needed concepts in Section 4.1 and present the main characterization theorem
in Section 4.2. Before proceeding, note that the analysis so far has pinned down the marginal
news distribution for each market segment but leaves the joint news distribution across
market segments unspecified. This is because under the assumption of expressive voting, a
voter cares only about his marginal news distribution but not the joint news distribution,
despite that the latter clearly affects candidates’ strategic reasoning. In Appendix A, we
consider all joint news distributions that are consistent with the marginal news distributions
solved in Section 3. Here, we restrict attention to news signals that are conditionally
independent across market segments for any given state realization. The implication of this
restriction will soon become clear.
4.1 Key concepts
All concepts of this section are defined for a given pair of personalization technology S ∈
{b, p} and population function q. We first describe how a candidate’s unilateral deviation
from a symmetric policy profile 〈−a, a〉 with a ≥ 0 can affect expressive voting decisions.
Due to symmetry, it suffices to consider candidate R’s deviation to a′.
Definition 2. A unilateral deviation of candidate R from a symmetric policy profile 〈−a, a〉
with a ≥ 0 to a′ attracts type k voters if it wins the latter’s support even when their news
signal disapproves of candidate R, i.e.,
v
(−a, a′, k)+ µSL (a, k) > 0.
It repels type k voters if it loses the latter’s support even when their news signal endorses
candidate R, i.e.,
v
(−a, a′, k)+ µSR (a, k) < 0.20
Note that if a′ attracts (resp. repels) a voter, then it makes him vote for (resp. against)
20Replacing strict inequalities with weak inequalities wouldn’t affect the upcoming analysis.
22
candidate R unconditionally. If it neither attracts or repels a voter, then it has no effect
on the voter’s expressive voting decision. Also note that a′ = t (k) is the most attractive
deviation to type k voters.
We next describe equilibrium outcomes. In what follows, we will use ES,q to denote the
set of nonnegative policy a’s such that the symmetric policy profile 〈−a, a〉’s can arise in
equilibrium. We are interested in the policy polarization aS,q = max ES,q, defined as the
maximal symmetric equilibrium policy, and whether all policies between zero and policy
polarization can arise in equilibrium. The following concepts facilitate analysis.
Definition 3. φS (−a, a′, k) = v (−a, a′, k) + µSL (a, k) is type k voters’ susceptibility to
candidate R’s deviation from a symmetric policy profile 〈−a, a〉 with a ≥ 0 to a′ following
unfavorable news to R’s fitness, and −φS (−a, a′, k) is type k voters’ resistance to a′ in this
situation.
Definition 4. The k-proof set is the set of nonnegative policy a’s such that no unilateral
deviation of candidate R from 〈−a, a〉 attracts type k voters, i.e., φS (−a, a′, k) ≤ 0 ∀a′.
Since a′ = t (k) is the most attractive deviation to type k voters, it follows that
ΞS (k) =
{
a ≥ 0 : φS (−a, t (k) , k) ≤ 0} .
Type k voters’ policy latitude ξS (k) is the maximum of the k-proof set, i.e., ξS (k) =
max ΞS (k). Type k voters are disciplining if their policy latitude determines policy polar-
ization, i.e., aS,q = ξS (k).
Note that a voter’s policy latitude decreases (resp. increases) with his susceptibility
(resp. resistance) to R’s policy deviations.
4.2 Main characterization
The next theorem gives a full characterization of the equilibrium policy set.
Theorem 2. Assume Assumptions 1 and 2. Then for any pair of personalization technology
S ∈ {b, p} and population function q, policy polarization is strictly positive, and all policies
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between zero and policy polarization can arise in equilibrium, i.e., aS,q > 0 and ES,q =[
0, aS,q
]
. Moreover, disciplining voters always exist, and their identities are as follows.
(i) Median voters are disciplining in the broadcast case, i.e., ab,q = ξb (0) ∀q.
(ii) In the personalized case, median voters are disciplining if they constitute a majority
of the population. Otherwise voters with the smallest policy latitude are disciplining,
i.e.,
ap,q =

ξp (0) if q (0) > 1/2,
min
k∈K
ξp (k) otherwise.
In what follows, we will first sketch the proof for Theorem 2 in Section 4.2.1 and then
discuss the determinants of disciplining voter in the personalized case in Section 4.2.2. All
results of Section 4.2.1 are restated for arbitrary finite types of voters holding general policy
preferences in Appendix A and are proven in Appendix E.2. All results of Section 4.2.2 are
proven for the distant utility function in Appendix E.4.
4.2.1 Proof sketch
Broadcast case Since all voters receive the same voting recommendation in this case,
a deviation of candidate R is profitable, i.e., strictly increases his winning probability, if
and only it attracts a majority of voters. Under the usual assumption that voters’ policy
preferences exhibit increasing differences, this is equivalent to attracting median voters, so a
symmetric policy profile 〈−a, a〉 with a ≥ 0 can arise in equilibrium if and only if a belongs
to the 0-proof set:
Eb,q = Ξb (0) ∀q.
Personalized case In this case, median voters remain disciplining if they constitute a
majority of the population. Otherwise no type of voter alone forms a majority, and a
deviation is profitable if it attracts any type of voter, holding other things constant. The
reason is pivotality: since the infomediary can now offer conditionally independent signals
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to different types of voters, the above deviation strictly increases candidate R’s winning
probability when the remaining voters disagree about which candidate to vote for.
The above argument leaves open the question of whether attracting some voters would
cause the repulsion of others. Fortunately, this concern is ruled out by the next lemma.
Lemma 3. Assume Assumptions 1 and 2. Then in the case where S = p and q (0) ≤ 1/2,
a symmetric policy profile 〈−a, a〉 with a ≥ 0 can arise in equilibrium if and only if no
unilateral deviation of candidate R from it to a′ ∈ [−a, a) attracts any voter whose bliss
point lies inside [−a, a].
The proof of Lemma 3 examines two kinds of uniform deviations: (1) a′ /∈ [−a, a]
and (2) a′ ∈ [−a, a). By committing the first kind of deviation, candidate R may indeed
attract, say, right-wing voters. But this success must cause the repulsion of left-wing voters
and winds up reducing candidate R’s winning probability. Meanwhile, the second kind of
deviation repels no voter, and it attracts no voter whose bliss point lies outside [−a, a]. If,
in addition, it attracts no voter whose bliss point lies inside [−a, a], then the original policy
profile 〈−a, a〉 can be sustained in equilibrium.
By Lemma 3, a policy profile 〈−a, a〉 with a ∈ [0, t (1)) can arise in equilibrium if and
only a belongs to the 0-proof set, and a policy profile 〈−a, a〉 with a ∈ [t (1) , a] can arise in
equilibrium if and only a belongs to the k-proof set for all k ∈ K:
Ep,q =
(
[0, t (1))
⋂
Ξp (0)
)⋃(
[t (1) , a] ∩
⋂
k∈K
Ξp (k)
)
.
Equilibrium policy set It remains to prove existence of disciplining voter with a positive
policy latitude, and to demonstrate that all policies between zero and discipining voters’
policy latitude can arise in equilibrium. For starters, notice that the k-proof set is nonempty
and indeed contains |t (k) |. Uniform strict obedience plays a crucial role in our argument:
for k ≥ 0, our claim is true because at 〈−|t (k) |, |t (k) |〉, candidate R is already adopting
type k voters’ most preferred position and so cannot attract them by committing any
deviation, i.e., v (−|t (k) |, |t (k) |, k) + µSL (|t (k) |, k) < 0. A consequence of this observation
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is that type k voter’s policy latitude, defined as the maximum of the k-proof set, weakly
exceeds |t (k) |.21 After more work, we can show that all policies between |t (k) | and type
k voters’ policy latitude belong to the k-proof set. We summarize these results in the next
lemma.
Lemma 4. The following hold under Assumptions 1 and 2.
(i) ξb (0) > 0 and ΞS (0) =
[
0, ξb (0)
]
.
(ii) For each k ∈ K, ξp (k) > |t (k) | and [t (k) , ξp (k)] ⊆ Ξp (k).
Based on Lemma 4, we develop an algorithm to calculate the equilibrium policy set in
the appendix. For the case where S = p and q (0) ≤ 1/2, straightforward algebra shows that
Ep,q = [0,mink∈K ξp (k)], thus proving the claims we made at the beginning of the previous
paragraph.
Remark Personalized news aggregation allows candidates to benefit from attracting any
type of voter rather than median voters only. Voters with the smallest policy latitude are
the most susceptible to policy deviations, so the deviation to their bliss point constrains
policy polarization.22 While this effect makes polarization harder to sustain compared to
the broadcast case, there is a countervailing effect stemming from changes in marginal news
distributions and, hence, policy latitudes. We now turn to this second effect and will come
back to the first effect in Section 6.1.
4.2.2 Determinants of disciplining voter
The next lemma decomposes a voter’s policy latitude into (i) the negative of his bliss point
and (ii) the magnitude of his belief about candidate R’s fitness following unfavorable news.
21While this observation implies that policy polarization could exceed all voters’ bliss points, this conclu-
sion depends much on the assumption of three types of voters. Appendix A investigates an extension to
arbitrary finite types of voters and characterizes policy polarization by the minimal policy latitude across all
influential coalitions, defined as voter coalitions that can influence the electoral outcome. If we interpret the
extreme voters here as the disciplining coalition of the general model (≈ average right-leaning/left-leaning
voters), then our result is broadly consistent with the stylized fact that candidate could adopt more extreme
positions than the average voters of their constituencies (see, e.g., Barber and McCarty (2015)).
22Thus, adopting median voter’s position is not a dominant strategy for candidate R, and it is not true
that candidate R becomes more liked by all voters as he moves from aS,q to 0.
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Note that in the broadcast case, the relevant voter is the representative voter with zero bliss
point.
Lemma 5. Let everything be as in Theorem 2. Then the following happen when a is large.
(i) ξb (0) = |µbL| := µbL (t (1)).
(ii) For any k ∈ K, ξp (k) = −t (k) + |µpL (k) |, where µpL (k) := µpL (|t (k) |, k).
As a voter’s bliss point increases, he more prefers candidate R’s policies, which re-
duces his policy latitude. At the same time, he seeks bigger occasional surprises from
news consumption and so becomes more pessimistic about candidate R’s fitness following
unfavorable news, which increases his policy latitude. This tension between policy prefer-
ence and belief has subtle implications for the disciplining voter in the personalized case.23
Consider candidate R’s choice between attracting his base (right-wing voters) and attract-
ing his opposition (left-wing voters). While right-wing voters most prefer candidate R’s
policies, they are the most pessimistic about his fitness following unfavorable news. In
contrast, left-wing voters are the most optimistic about candidate R’s fitness following un-
favorable news, yet they have an inherent preference against his policies. In the case where
−t (−1) + |µpL (−1) | < −t (1) + |µpL (1) |, left-wing voters have a smaller policy latitude and
are therefore easier to attract than right-wing voters. Using symmetry µpL (−k) = −µpR (k)
and t (−k) = −t (k) to simplify, we obtain
|µpL (1) | − µpR (1) > 2t (1) , (∗)
which says that extreme voters’ signal must be sufficiently skewed that the beliefs induced
by the occasional big surprise and own-party bias differ by a significant amount. The next
23In the context of campaign spending and policymaking, Herrera, Levine, and Martinelli (2008), Hersh
(2015), and Prummer (2020) find that advances in micro-targeting technologies make the trade-off between
mobilizing base voters and persuading swing voters nontrivial. A common thread between these studies and
the current paper is that advances in personalization technologies could break the median voter theorem
and make the above described trade-off nontrivial (through very different mechanisms).
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example reduces Condition (∗) to model primitives in the case of Shannon entropy cost.24
Example 1. When attention cost is Shannon entropy-based, Condition (∗) holds when
the marginal attention cost λ is sufficiently high and extreme voters’ policy preference t (1)
is sufficiently extreme. As λ increases and so paying attention becomes more costly, the
infomediary makes news signals less Blackwell informative to prevent voters from tuning
out (Lemma 12 of Appendix E.3 formalizes this claim). When doing so, the infomediary
is reluctant to reduce |µpL (1) | because it is the occasional big surprise that makes news
consumption useful for right-wing voters. Instead, she reduces µpR (1) significantly, which
relaxes Condition (∗).
0.1
0.3
0.5
0.7
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6
t(1)
λ
Condition (*) and assumption 2 hold
Conditoin (*) fails and assumption 2 
 holds
Figure 1: Condition (∗): u (a, k) = −|t (k)− a| and entropy attention cost.
Meanwhile, as t (1) increases, right-wing voters more prefer candidate R’s policies, so to
convince them to vote for candidate L requires a stronger belief than before, i.e., |µpL (1) |
must increase. Also since news consumption becomes less useful to them, µpR (1) must
24In an earlier version of this paper, we did Example 1 for quadratic attention cost and obtained qualita-
tively similar results to those presented above. The material is available upon request.
28
decrease to prevent them from tuning out. Thus |µpL (1) | − µpR (1) increases, which relaxes
Condition (∗) when t (1) is sufficiently large. ♦
5 Comparative statics
This section examines how equilibrium policies depend on the personalization technology
S, marginal attention cost λ and voters’ population distribution q. Since all policies be-
tween zero and policy latitude can arise in equilibrium, it is without loss to focus on the
comparative statics of policy latitude.
5.1 Personalization technology
The next proposition prescribes the sufficient and necessary condition for personalized news
aggregation to increase policy polarization.
Proposition 1. Fix any population function q, assume Assumptions 1 and 2, and let a be
large. Then policy polarization is strictly higher in the personalized case than in the broadcast
case if and only if in the personalized case, either (i) median voters are disciplining, or (ii)
extreme voters are disciplining and have a bigger policy latitude than the median voters in
the broadcast case, i.e.,
ξb (0) < min {ξp (1) , ξp (−1)} . (∗∗)
Condition (∗∗) automatically holds if ξb (0) ≤ t (1). If ξb (0) > t (1), then Condition (∗∗) is
equivalent to:
(i) |µpL (1) | − |µbL| > t (1) if right-wing voters are disciplining in the personalized case;
(ii) |t (−1) | > |µbL|− |µpL (−1) | if left-wing voters are disciplining in the personalized case.
Proposition 1 follows immediately from Theorem 2 and Lemma 5. Part (i) exploits
the fact that median voters’ personalized signal is more Blackwell informative than the
optimal broadcast signal, so their policy latitude increases as news aggregation becomes
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personalized.25 Part (ii) shows that if extreme voters are disciplining in the personalized
case, then the skewness of their personalized signals is crucial for sustaining greater policy
polarization than in the broadcast case.
The role of skewness differs according to which type of extreme voter is disciplining.
If right-wing voters are disciplining, then the only explanation for why they could have a
bigger policy latitude than the median voters in the broadcast case must be the occasional
big surprise of their personalized signal. In order to satisfy Condition (∗∗), right-wing voters
must be significantly more pessimistic about candidate R’s fitness following unfavorable
news than the median voters in the broadcast case, i.e., |µpL (1) | − |µbL| > t (1).
In the case where opposition voters are disciplining, extreme voters’ personalized signals
must be sufficiently skewed to satisfy Condition (∗). Thus when contemplating deviations
from the equilibrium policy profile, candidate R wouldn’t target his base, because doing
so is either needless (in the likely event where he already captures his base) or futile (in
the unlikely event where the base is convinced of his unfitness). Instead, he appeals to
his opposition, which is itself challenging if the latter has a strong preference against his
policies, i.e., |t (−1) | > |µbL| − |µpL (−1) |. Note the role of skewness in the above argument,
which is crucial yet indirect.
Recently, there have been speculations that tech-enabled news personalization could
accelerate the rise in political polarization, and many policy interventions have been pro-
posed for limiting tech giants’ abilities to discriminate between different types of consumers.
Proposition 1 sheds light on the policy polarization effect of a particular regulatory pro-
posal: banning personalization. The next example solves this effect for entropy attention
cost.
Example 1 (Continued). Here we focus on the case where base voters are disciplining, i.e.,
Condition (∗) fails, and so Condition (∗∗) becomes |µpL (1) |−|µbL| > t (1). Appendix D covers
the case where opposition voters are disciplining. In Section 4.2.2, we already explained
25The past decade has witnessed an increase in the “apathy and indifference” that centrist voters display
to candidates’ policy positions (see, e.g., Barber and McCarty (2015)). Proposition 1(i) suggests that
personalized news aggregation could exacerbate this trend.
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why large values of marginal attention cost λ and extreme voters’ policy preference t (1)
make right-wing voters seek big surprise |µpL (1) |s from news consumption. In the current
context, this suggests that increases in λ and t (1) could (and indeed) relax Condition (∗∗).
Below we discuss why this intuition is robust to the introduction of |µbL|.
0.1
0.3
0.5
0.7
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6
t(1)
λ
Condition (*) fails and 
 assumption 2 holds
Condition (**) holds
Figure 2: Condition (∗∗): u (a, k) = −|t (k)− a|, entropy attention cost, Condition (∗) fails
and so base voters are disciplining in the personalized case.
First, recall that as λ increases, the infomediary makes news signals less Blackwell
informative to prevent voters from tuning out. In the personalized case, she can reduce
|µpL (1) | and µpR (1) differently to make news consumption still useful for right-wing voters
(as discussed in Section 4.2.2). Such flexibility is absent in the broadcast case, where |µbL|
and µbR must be reduced by the same magnitude. Thus |µbL| decreases faster than |µpL (1) |,
which relaxes Condition (∗∗).
Next, notice that as t (1) increases, extreme voters find news consumption less useful, so
the broadcast signal must become less Blackwell informative to prevent them from tuning
out, i.e., |µbL| must decrease. Meanwhile, |µpL (1) | must increase, because to convince right-
wing voters to vote for candidate L requires a bigger occasional surprise than before. Thus
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|µbL (1) | − |µbL| increases, which relaxes Condition (∗∗) when t (1) is sufficiently large. ♦
5.2 Marginal attention cost
The next proposition shows that policy polarization is decreasing in voters’ marginal atten-
tion cost.
Proposition 2. Let λ′′ > λ′ > 0 be two marginal attention costs such that the corre-
sponding environments satisfy Assumption 1 and 2. For each λ ∈ {λ′, λ′′}, write the policy
polarization under segmentation technology S and population function q as aS,q (λ). Then
aS,q (λ′′) < aS,q (λ′).
Proposition 2 holds because increases in the marginal attention cost make optimal news
signals less Blackwell informative and, in turn, reduce voters’ policy latitudes (Lemma 12
of Appendix E.3 formalizes the first part of this claim). In Appendix B, we investigate an
extension of the baseline model in which multiple infomediaries compete for voters’ atten-
tion using signals that maximize the latter’s expected utilities rather than their attention.
We find that introducing competition between infomediaries is mathematically equivalent
to increasing the marginal attention cost in the monopolistic personalized case, so its policy
polarization effect is negative by Proposition 2. Intuitively, optimal news signals overfeed
voters with information about candidate valence compared to competitive signals. Compe-
tition corrects this overfeeding problem and reduces policy polarization.
5.3 Population distribution
Recently, a growing body of the literature has been devoted to the understanding of voter po-
larization, also termed mass polarization. Notably, Fiorina and Abrams (2008) define mass
polarization as a bimodal distribution of voters’ policy preferences on a liberal-conservative
scale, and Gentzkow (2016) advocates the use of measures such as the average ideological
distance between Democrats and Republicans. Inspired by these authors, we define an in-
crease in mass polarization as a mean-preserving spread of voters’ policy preferences and
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examine its consequence on policy polarization. Note that our exercise is purely conceptual,
since the evidence on increasing mass polarization is mixed at best (as argued forcefully by
the above authors). Our goal is to call the reader’s attention to the following message that
stands in stark contrast to popular beliefs: with personalized news aggregation, increases
in mass polarization may decrease rather than increase policy polarization.
Proposition 3. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, ap,q ≥ ap,q′ for any two population functions
q and q′ such that q (0) > q′ (0), and ap,q > ap,q′ if and only if q (0) > 1/2 ≥ q′ (0) and
min {ξp (−1) , ξp (1)} < ξp (0).
Proposition 3 follows immediately Theorem 2, and the idea behind it is simple: as we
keep redistributing voters’ population from the center to the margin, candidates would
eventually benefit from attracting extreme voters in addition to median voters. If extreme
voters have smaller policy latitudes than median voters (as in Example 1), then a reduction
in policy polarization would ensue. While caution should be exercised when extrapolating
Proposition 3 to general environments, its warning message nevertheless warrants attention.
Appendix A.4.2 proves a similar result for the case of general voters and quadratic attention
cost.
6 Extensions
6.1 Joint news distribution
In Appendix A, we relax the assumption that news signals are conditionally independent
across market segments, and instead consider all joint news distributions that are consistent
with the marginal distributions solved in Section 3. We also extend the analysis to arbitrary
finite types of voters holding general policy preferences.
The analysis there leverages a new concept called influential coalition. Loosely speaking,
a coalition of voters is influential if attracting all its members, holding other things constant,
strictly increases the deviating candidate’s winning probability. In the broadcast case, all
voters consume the same signal, so a coalition of voters is influential if and only if it is a
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majority coalition. In the personalized case, non-majority coalitions can be influential, due
to the imperfect correlation between the signals consumed by different voters. The next
table compiles the influential coalitions in the baseline model.
S = b S = p
q(0) > 1/2 majority coalitions majority coalitions
q(0) < 1/2 majority coalitions nonempty coalitions
Table 1: influential coalitions under any symmetric policy profile 〈−a, a〉 with a ≥ 0:
baseline model.
As it turns out, influential coalitions depend on the joint news distribution only through
the news configuration χ—a matrix that compiles all voting recommendation profiles that
occur with positive probabilities. Let Cs denote the influential coalitions formed under the
pair 〈χ, q〉. Theorem 3 of Appendix A.3 generalizes Theorem 2, showing that under certain
regularity conditions, the set of nonnegative policy a’s such that the symmetric policy profile
〈−a, a〉’s can arise in equilibrium under personalization technology S, news configuration χ
and population function q is
[
0, min
C′s formed under 〈χ,q〉
ξS (C)
]
where ξS (C) is the policy latitude of C and depends only on marginal news distributions.
The messages are twofold. First, in general, it is the influential coalition with the smallest
policy latitude that disciplines policy polarization. Second, factors that enrich influential
coalitions through the news configuration χ or the population distribution q reduce policy
polarization, holding marginal news distributions constant.
So far we have focused on the role of marginal news distribution in determining policy
polarization. We now turn to the role of joint news distribution.
Modify existing insights Consider first the transition from broadcast news and person-
alized news. As we pointed out earlier, personalized news enriches influential coalitions in
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addition to changing marginal news distributions compared to broadcast news. Since enrich-
ing influential coalitions reduces policy polarization, the reader can attribute the increase
in policy polarization as shown in Proposition 1 to changes in marginal news distributions
(Proposition 5 of Appendix A.4.1 formalizes this claim).
Consider next the case of personalized news. In Appendix A.4.1, we show that influ-
ential coalitions are the richest for any given population function when news signals are
conditionally independent across voters, and they are the richest across all scenarios if, in
addition, voters’ population distribution is uniform across types. The following implications
are immediate.
• Relaxing the assumption of conditional independence can only increase policy polar-
ization. Dividing the same type of votes into multiple subgroups and providing them
with imperfectly correlated signals can only decrease policy polarization.
• mink∈K ξp (k) (as in Theorem 2(ii) Case q (0) ≤ 1/2) constitutes the exact lower bound
for the policy polarization that can be attained across all scenarios. As long as this
lower bound stays positive, changes in the environment (e.g., enriching voters’ type
space, dividing the same type of voters into multiple subgroups) wouldn’t render
policy polarization trivial.
Application Recently, news aggregators such as Allsides.com have been built to battle
the rising polarization via providing users with neutral viewpoints. Our analysis sheds light
on the policy polarization effect of implementing these aggregators on a large scale. In
our baseline model, providing extreme voters with neutral viewpoints (written as S = n)
is mathematically equivalent to keeping their marginal news distribution the same as that
in the broadcast case, but relaxing the assumption that news signals must be perfectly
correlated across voters. At the opposite extreme where news signals are conditionally
independent across voters, right-wing voters have the smallest policy latitude −t (1) + |µbL|
and are therefore disciplining. In that case, S = n reduces policy polarization compared
to S = b, and it reduces policy polarization compared to S = p if either centrist voters
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or right-wing voters are disciplining in the latter case (and so policy polarization equals
|µpL (0) | and −t (1) + |µpL (1) |, respectively).
6.2 Beyond uniform strict obedience
The analysis so far has assumed uniform strict obedience, i.e., the optimal news signal
consumed by any voter must satisfy (SOB) for any given pair of personalization technology
and feasible policy profile. Three assumptions together guarantee that this is the case:
(i) the state is binary, (ii) optimal news signals are nondegenerate, and (iii) voters face
binary decision problems. We now relax each of these assumptions. The takeaways are
twofold. First, uniform strict obedience is sufficient but not necessary for generating policy
divergence.26 Second, relaxing different assumptions have different implications for policy
polarization.
General state distribution Appendix C extends the general model of Appendix A
(featuring arbitrary finite types of voters with general policy preferences) to general state
distributions. The findings are threefold. First, any optimal personalized signal that makes
its consumers’ participation constraint binding has at most two realizations (for the same
reason given in the baseline model). Second, any optimal broadcast signal that induces
consumption from all voters and makes some voters’ participation constraints binding has
at most three realizations, and policy polarization equals zero in the new case of three signal
realizations.27
To develop intuition for the broadcast case, we aggregate voters with binding participa-
tion constraints into a representative voter (as we did in the baseline model). If all voters
share the same marginal attention cost (as we assumed in the baseline model), then only
voters of the most extreme types can have binding participation constraints.28 Together,
26Finding the sufficient and necessary condition for NARI to generate policy divergence is a challenging
yet fascinating topic for future research.
27We assume that all voters consume news in order to maintain consistency between the baseline model.
We will relax this assumption later in this section.
28We assume a constant marginal attention cost across voters to keep consistency between the baseline
model. Generically, at most two types of voters can have binding participation constraints in a symmetric
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these voters make three decisions in total: LL, LR and RR, where the first and second
letters stand for the voting decisions made by the most left-leaning voter and the most
right-leaning voter, respectively. The optimal broadcast signal maximizes the attention of
the representative voter acting on behalf of these voters, so it prescribes at most three voting
recommendation profiles. Moreover, for the case where all three decision profiles LL, LR
and RR are recommended with positive probabilities, it can be shown that the posterior
mean of the state given the recommendation profile LR must equal zero. For the reason
given in the footnote, this implies that 〈0, 0〉 is the only symmetric policy profile that can
arise in equilibrium.29
Exclusion from news consumption The next example shows that policy polarization
could still be positive even if extreme voters are excluded from news consumption, suggesting
that abstentions from news consumption due to high marginal attention cost or mistaken
exclusions of some voters from news consumption due to model misspecification wouldn’t
necessarily render policy polarization trivial.
Example 2. Let everything be as in the baseline model except that extreme voters are
excluded from news consumption. As shown in Appendix E.4, all symmetric policy profile
〈−a, a〉s with a ∈ [0, ξ] can arise in equilibrium, where ξ = min{t (1) , ξS (0)}. ♦
Beyond binary decision problems So far we’ve focused on the role of news consump-
tion in facilitating expressive voting. While other motives for news consumption such as
entertainment are certainly important and should be incorporated into future studies, we
also believe that limited attention is ubiquitous and, as pointed out by Downs (1957), “con-
stitutes a basic step towards understanding politics.” By now, it is well known that if
voters face finite decision problems, e.g., form coarse opinion about the valence state, then
environment.
29For any symmetric policy profile 〈−a, a〉 with a > 0, the deviation to a′ = 0 weakly increases can-
didate R’s winning probability when the voting recommendation profile is either LL or RR (Lemma 3),
and it strictly increases candidate R’s winning probability when the voting recommendation profile is LR.
Meanwhile, no unilateral deviation from 〈0, 0〉 increases candidate R’s winning probability when the voting
recommendation profile is LL or RR (Lemma 3) or LR.
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the outcome of NARI is a finite signal (Mateˇjka and McKay (2015)). Indeed, the same
conclusion can sometimes been drawn for decision problems in which the state space and
decision space are both infinite (Jung et al. (2019)). Below we give an example in which
policy polarization is positive, despite that extreme voters’ signals have more than two re-
alizations and do not always induce strict preferences between the candidates. Providing
microfoundations for these signal structures, while desirable, is beyond the scope of the
current paper.
Example 3. In the baseline model, suppose extreme voters’ personalized signals have three
realizations L, M and R, and each of them strictly prefers candidate L to R when his signal
realization is L, is indifferent between the two candidates when his signal realization is
M , and strictly prefers candidate R to L when his signal realization is R. As shown in
Appendix E.4, the policy profile 〈−t (1) , t (1)〉 can arise in equilibrium if median voters’
policy latitude exceeds t (1). ♦
6.3 Other extensions
Skewness effect vs. level effect Compared to the optimal broadcast signal, the optimal
personalized signals for extreme voters are skewed and attract a greater amount of attention
from its consumers. Following Stro¨mberg (2015) (quoted in Footnote 4), we shall name these
effects as the skewness effect and level effect, respectively. The level effect increases policy
polarization because of the trade-off between policy and valence. The next example proves
the effectiveness of the skewness effect alone in increasing policy polarization.
Example 1 (Continued). In the current example, only extreme voters can be disciplining
in the personalized case. Fix these voters’ attention to the broadcast level I
(
Πb (a)
)
and
solve for their most preferred signals. Compare the policy latitudes constructed based on
these signals and the policy polarization in the broadcast case. If the former exceeds the
latter, than we say that skewness effect alone could increase policy polarization. As depicted
in Figure 3, this is indeed the case for some parameter values. ♦
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 assumption 2 hold
Skewness effect per se alone 
 increases polarization
Figure 3: Skewness effect: u (a, k) = −|t (k) − a|, entropy attention cost, Condition (∗∗)
holds and so personalized news aggregation increases policy polarization.
Heterogeneous marginal attention cost A consequence of assuming a constant marginal
attention cost across voters is that median voters pay more attention than extreme voters
in the personalized case. Allowing the marginal attention cost to differ across voters helps
reconcile our findings with the stylized fact that extreme voters tend be more attentive to
politics than centrist voters (see, e.g., Barber and McCarty (2015)). The only qualitative
difference this change might but not necessarily cause is to make median voters’ participa-
tion constraint binding and extreme voters’ participation constraints slack in the broadcast
case. In that situation, the broadcast signal coincides with median voters’ personalized
signal, so personalized news aggregation could only decrease policy polarization.
Alternative segmentation technologies Our analysis can be generalized beyond the
cases of broadcast news and personalized news. In Section 6.1, we already covered the
case where the segmentation technology is finer than the personalized technology. For
segmentation technologies that are finer than the broadcast technology but coarser than
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the personalized technology, we can first aggregate, for each market segment, voters with
binding participation constraints into a representative voter, and then solve for the opti-
mal personalized signals for representative voters. The aggregation problem is the most
straightforward if all market segments consist of consecutive types of voters and do not
simultaneously contain left-leaning and right-leaning voters. This is because in that case,
at most one of type voter’s participation constraint is binding within each market segment.
7 Concluding remarks
Tech-enabled personalization is ubiquitous and seems to maximize social surplus by best
serving consumers’ needs. In our opinion, a caveat to this argument is that tech giants now
constitute major providers of political news and could therefore affect political decisions
and outcomes. The current paper studies the policy polarization effect of personalized
news aggregation for rational inattentive voters. We find that after taking this effect into
account, the welfare consequences of many hotly debated regulatory proposals for taming
the tech giants become less clear-cut. For example, while both banning personalized news
and introducing competition between infomediaries would make voters better off and the
infomediary worse off, holding policies constant, they also affect policy polarization and,
hence, the demand for news. For this reason, we recommend that caution must be exercised
when evaluating and implementing these proposals.
Our characterization of equilibrium policies holds as long as voters’ signals are binary and
satisfy (SOB). While NARI provides a foundation for such signal structures, we don’t deny
the existence of other foundations and are open to applying our theory to other settings. In
a follow-up paper Hu, Li, and Segal (2020), we build on the tools developed in the current
paper to study the effects of personalized news aggregation on voter turnout and political
accountability. One could also imagine IO applications of our theory, e.g., studying the
effects of personalized product recommendation on product differentiation and consumer
welfare.
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So far, we have restricted news consumers to single-homing, i.e., obtain news from a
single infomediary. Given the monopoly power wielded by tech giants, we believe we have
taken a useful first step towards studying news aggregation for rational inattention voters.
At the same time, it is tempting to believe in the high-level idea that all media outlets are,
in some sense, information aggregators. Formalizing this idea requires major innovations of
the RI theory and, in particular, to introduce multi-homing to our NARI model.
At least three challenges must be tackled before we can evaluate the empirical relevance
of our theory. The first challenge is to develop rigorous methods of studying how people pay
attention in the political context (see Angelucci and Prat (2020) for a recent progress in this
direction). The second challenge is to identify exogenous shocks to major news aggregators
stemming from, e.g., experiments conducted by tech companies themselves, or unexpected
regulatory interventions such as Spain’s shutdown of Google News in 2014 (see, e.g., Athey,
Mobius, and Pal (2017)). The third challenge is to figure out the disciplining voter using
methods akin to what Hersh (2015) pioneered for studying personalized campaign.30 We
hope someone, maybe us, will tackle these challenges in the future.
A General model
This appendix has two purposes. The first purpose is to extend the baseline model to
general voters with a finite set K = {−K, · · · , 0, · · · ,K} of types, a population function
q : K → R++, and a utility function u : A × K → R. Throughout this appendix, K can
be any positive integer, q has support K and is symmetric around zero, and u satisfies the
following assumption.31
Assumption 3. The following hold for any k ∈ K.
continuity and concavity u (·, k) is continuous and concave.
30As mentioned in Footnote 23, recent advances in micro-targeting technologies have made candidates’
choices between mobilizing base voters and persuading swing voters nonobvious. The solution pioneered by
Hersh (2015) involves interviewing campaign staff and volunteers on a large scale.
31Assumption 3 holds for many standard utility functions in the literature, e.g., −|t (k) − a| and
− (t (k)− a)2.
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symmetry u (a, k) = u (−a,−k) for any a ∈ A.
inverted V-shape u (·, k) is strictly increasing on [−a, t (k)] and is strictly decreasing on
[t (k) , a], where the bliss point function t : K → int (A) is strictly increasing and
satisfies t (k) = −t (−k) for any k ∈ K.
In addition,
increasing differences u (a, k) − u (a′, k) is increasing in k for any a > a′. For any
a > 0, u (a, k) − u (−a, k) is strictly positive if k > 0, equals zero if k = 0 and is
strictly negative if k < 0.
The second purpose of this appendix is to relax the assumption that news is conditionally
independent across market segments. To this end, we develop new concepts in Appendix
A.1 and conduct equilibrium analyses in Appendices A.2-A.4. Omitted proofs can be found
in Appendix E.2.
A.1 Key concepts
Joint news distribution A joint news distribution is a tuple 〈χ,b+,b−〉 of news con-
figuration χ and probability vectors b+ and b−. The news configuration χ is a matrix of
|K| rows. Each column of χ constitutes a profile of the voting recommendations to type
−K, · · · ,K voters that occurs with a strictly positive probability. Each entry of χ is either
0 or 1, where 0 means that candidate R is disapproved and 1 means that he is endorsed.
For example, the news configuration is
χ∗ =

0 1
0 1
...
...
0 1

42
if S = b, and it is
χ∗∗ =

0 1 0 · · · 0 1 · · · 0 · · · 1
0 0 1 · · · 0 1 · · · 0 · · · 1
...
...
... · · · ... ... · · · ... · · · 1
0 0 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 1 · · · 1
0 0 0 · · · 1 0 · · · 1 · · · 1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
2|K| columns
if S = p and news signals are conditionally independent across market segments. The
vectors b+ and b− compile the probabilities that the columns of χ occur in states ω = 1
and ω = −1, respectively. By definition, all elements of b+ or b− are strictly positive and
add up to one.
We restrict attention to symmetric joint news distributions. To formally define sym-
metry, let x be a generic voting recommendation profile, 1 be the |K|-vector of all ones,
and
P =

1
. .
.
1

be a |K| × |K| permutation matrix. Define the symmetry operator Σ as
Σ ◦ x = P (1− x) ,
so x recommends candidate z ∈ {L,R} to type k voters if and only if Σ ◦ x recommends
candidate −z to type −k voters. Then,32
Definition 5. A news configuration χ is symmetric if for any m ∈ {1, · · · , columns (χ)},
there exists n ∈ {1, · · · , columns (χ)} such that Σ ◦ [χ]m = [χ]n. A joint news distri-
bution 〈χ,b+,b−〉 is symmetric if χ is symmetric and [b+]m = [b−]n for any m,n ∈
{1, · · · , columns (χ)} such that Σ ◦ [χ]m = [χ]n.
32[·]m denotes both the mth entry of a column vector and the mth column of a matrix. columns (χ) denotes
the number of columns of χ.
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In words, a joint news distribution is symmetric if the probability that a voting rec-
ommendation profile x occurs in state ω = 1 equals the probability that Σ ◦ x occurs in
state ω = −1. We consider symmetric joint news distributions that are consistent with the
marginal news distributions solved in Section 3. In Footnote 17, we solved for the probabil-
ities that the news signal consumed by type k voters endorses candidate R in states ω = 1
and ω = −1, respectively. Compiling these probabilities across type −K, · · · ,K voters for
any given personalization technology S ∈ {b, p} and symmetric policy profile 〈−a, a〉 with
a ≥ 0 yield two |K|-vectors piS,+ (a) and piS,− (a). Then,
Definition 6. A news configuration χ is 〈S, a〉-consistent for some S ∈ {b, p} and a ≥ 0 if
there exist probability vectors b+ and b− such that the joint news distribution 〈χ,b+,b−〉
is 〈S, a〉-consistent, i.e.,
χb+ = piS,+ (a) and χb− = piS,− (a) .
χ is S-consistent if it is 〈S, a〉-consistent for all a ≥ 0.
Note that χ∗ is b-consistent and indeed the only 〈b, a〉-consistent news configuration for
any given a ≥ 0. χ∗∗ is p-consistent, but it is in general not uniquely p-consistent.
Susceptibility to policy deviations The next definition extends Definitions 2 and 3 to
sets of voters.
Definition 7. Under personalization technology S, a unilateral deviation of candidate R
from a symmetric policy profile 〈−a, a〉 with a ≥ 0 to a′ attracts a set D ⊆ K of voters
if it attracts all members of D, i.e., φS (−a, a′, k) > 0 ∀k ∈ D. This is equivalent to
φS (−a, a′,D) > 0, where
φS
(−a, a′,D) = min
k∈D
φS
(−a, a′, k)
is the D-susceptibility to a′ following unfavorable news to candidate R’s fitness.
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Influential coalition The next concept is integral to the upcoming analysis.
Definition 8. Fix any personalization technology S ∈ {b, p}, any symmetric policy profile
〈−a, a〉 with a ≥ 0 and any population function q, and let the default be the strictly obedient
outcome induced by any joint news distribution 〈χ,b+,b−〉 that is 〈S, a〉-consistent. Then a
set C ⊆ K of voters constitutes an R-influential coalition, or influential coalition for short,
if attracting C while holding other things constant strictly increases candidate R’s winning
probability compared to the default.
By definition, majority coalitions are influential, and supersets of influential coalitions
are influential. In the broadcast case, all voters consume the same news signal, so a coalition
of voters is influential if and only if it is a majority coalition. In the personalized case, non-
majority coalitions can be influential due to the imperfect correlation between voters’ news
signals (see Table 1 for an illustration). As we demonstrate in the next lemma, influential
coalitions depend on the joint news distribution only through the news configuration, and
they are independent of candidates’ policy positions if the news configuration is S-consistent.
Lemma 6. Let everything be as in Definition 8. Then influential coalitions depend on
the joint news distribution 〈χ,b+,b−〉 only through the news configuration χ, and they are
independent of the policy profile 〈−a, a〉 if χ is S-consistent.
A.2 Main lemma
The next lemma gives a full characterization of the symmetric policy profiles that can arise
in equilibrium, thus extending Lemma 3 of Section 4.2.1 to general voters and joint news
distributions.
Lemma 7. Fix any pair of personalization technology S ∈ {b, p} and population function
q, and assume Assumptions 1-3. Then the following are equivalent.
(i) A symmetric policy profile 〈−a, a〉 with a ≥ 0 can arise in an equilibrium with a joint
news distribution 〈χ,b+,b−〉 that is 〈S, a〉-consistent.
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(ii) No unilateral deviation of candidate R from 〈−a, a〉 to a′ ∈ [−a, a) attracts any in-
fluential coalition formed under 〈χ, q〉 whose members have ideological bliss points in
[−a, a].
In what follows, we will use ES,χ,q denote the set of the nonnegative policy a’s such
that the symmetric policy profile 〈−a, a〉’s can arise in equilibrium under personalization
technology S, news configuration χ and population function q. Lemma 7 prescribes a
two-step procedure for computing this set.
Step 1. Compute the influential coalitions formed under 〈χ, q〉. For each a ≥ 0, check if any
unilateral deviation of candidate R from 〈−a, a〉 to a′ ∈ [−a, a) attracts any influential
coalition whose members have bliss points in [−a, a]. If the answer is negative, then
add a to the temporary output set E˜S,χ,q.
Step 2. For each a ∈ E˜S,χ,q, check if χ is 〈S, a〉-consistent. If the answer is negative, then
remove a from E˜S,χ,q.
The above procedure outputs ES,χ,q. If χ is S-consistent, then no element of E˜S,χ,q
needs to be removed in Step 2, i.e., E˜S,χ,q = ES,χ,q.
A.3 Main theorem
This appendix gives characterizations of the equilibrium policy set ES,χ,q for S-consistent
news configuration χs. As before, we define the maximum of ES,χ,q as the policy polarization
and denote it by aS,χ,q. The next definition generalizes Definition 4 to sets of voters.
Definition 9. For any personalization technology S ∈ {b, p} and any set D ⊆ K of voters,
define the D-proof set ΞS (D) as the set of nonnegative policy a’s such that no unilateral
deviations of candidate R from symmetric policy profile 〈−a, a〉’s attract D, i.e.,
ΞD (D) =
{
a ≥ 0 : max
a′∈A
φS
(−a, a′,D) ≤ 0} .
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Also define D’s policy latitude ξS (D) as the maximum of the D-proof set, i.e.,
ξS (D) = max ΞS (D) .
D is disciplining under personalization technology S, news configuration χ and population
distribution q if its policy latitude determines the policy polarization, i.e., aS,χ,q = ξS (D).
We next state the needed assumptions for conducting the upcoming analysis. In addi-
tion to Assumptions 1-3, we require that the susceptibility function φS (−a, a′, k) must be
increasing in a in a local region.33
Assumption 4. φS (−a, a′, k) is increasing in a on [|t (k) |, a] for any S ∈ {b, p}, k ∈ K
and a′ ∈ A.
We now state our main theorem, which extends Theorem 2 of Section 4.2 to general
voters and joint news distributions.
Theorem 3. Fix any personalization technology S ∈ {b, p}, S-consistent news configuration
χ and population function q, and let Cs denote the influential coalition formed under 〈χ, q〉.
Under Assumptions 1-4, ES,χ,q = [0, aS,χ,q], where aS,χ,q = min
Cs formed under 〈χ,q〉
ξS (C) > 0.
Theorem 3 conveys two messages. First, for general voters and joint news distributions,
it is the influential coalition with the smallest policy latitude that disciplines the policy
polarization. Second, marginal news distributions affect policy polarization through pol-
icy latitudes, whereas the joint news distribution does so through the news configuration,
holding marginal news distributions constant.
A.4 Comparative statics
This appendix examines the comparative statics of the equilibrium policy set ES,χ,q for
S-consistent χs. Since ES,χ,q = [0, aS,χ,q], it is without loss to focus on the comparative
33Recall that φS (−a, a′, k) := v (−a, a′, k) + µSL (a, k). Since v (−a, a′, k) is increasing in a on [|t (k) |, a]
by Assumption 3 inverted V-shape, Assumption 4 holds if µSL (a, k) doesn’t vary significantly with a on
[|t (k) |, a]. As shown in Lemma 11 of Appendix E.2.1, this is the case if S = b or if S = p and either
u (a, k) = −|t (k)− a| or h (µ) = µ2.
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statics of aS,χ,q.
A.4.1 Influential coalitions
This appendix examines factors that affect policy polarization through influential coalitions.
The analysis exploits a simple observation, namely enriching the news configuration enriches
influential coalitions and, by Theorem 3, reduces policy polarization. Formally, we say that
χ is richer than χ′ and write χ  χ′ if χ prescribes more voting recommendation profiles
than χ′.
Definition 10. χ  χ′ if every column of χ′ is a column of χ.
Lemma 8. {Cs formed under 〈χ′, q〉} ⊆ {Cs formed under 〈χ, q〉} for any personalization
technology S ∈ {b, p}, any S-consistent news configurations χ and χ′ such that χ  χ′, and
any population function q.
We examine two implications of Lemma 8. We first demonstrate that in the personalized
case, policy polarization is minimized when news signals are conditionally independent
across voters, holding other things constant, and it is globally minimized if, in addition,
voters’ population distribution is uniform across types.
Proposition 4. Under Assumptions 1-4, min
k∈K
ξp (k) = ap,χ
∗∗,uniform ≤ ap,χ∗∗,q ≤ ap,χ,q for
any p-consistent news configuration χ and any population function q.
Proof. To establish the second inequality, note that χ∗∗  χ for any p-consistent χ. To
establish the first equality and inequality, note that under χ∗∗ and uniform population
distribution, each type of voter is influential, and the collection of influential coalitions
2K − {∅} is the richest across all scenarios. Combining these observations with Theorem 3
and Lemma 8 gives the desired result.
Consider next the transition from broadcast news to personalized news. Since this
transition enriches the news configuration, its policy polarization effect is negative, holding
other things constant. Given this, the reader can attribute the increasing policy polarization
as shown in Proposition 1 to changes in marginal news distributions only.
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Proposition 5. {Cs formed under 〈χ∗, q〉} ⊆ {Cs formed under 〈χ, q〉} for any p-consistent
news configuration χ and any population function q.
Proof. For any χ and q as above, {Cs formed under 〈χ∗, q〉}
= {coalitions that include a majority of voters} ⊆ {Cs formed under 〈χ, q〉}
A.4.2 Mass polarization
This appendix continues to investigate the policy polarization effect of mass polarization.
The next definition is inspired by Fiorina and Abrams (2008) and Gentzkow (2016).
Definition 11. The mass is more polarized under q′ than q if q has second-order stochastic
dominance over q′ (write q SOSD q′), i.e.,
K∑
k=m
q (k) ≤
K∑
k=m
q′ (k) ∀m = 1, · · · ,K.
The analysis assumes quadratic attention cost.
Assumption 5. h (µ) = µ2.
The next proposition proves a similar result to Proposition 3 for general voters and
p-consistent news configurations.
Proposition 6. Under Assumptions 1-3 and 5, ap,χ,q ≥ ap,χ,q′ for any p-consistent news
configuration χ and any two population functions q and q′ such that q SOSD q′.
B Competitive infomediaries
This appendix investigates an extension to competitive infomediaries. In the general envi-
ronment laid out in Appendix A, suppose m (k) ≥ 2 infomediaries compete for the attention
of type k voters for each k ∈ K. A market segment is a pair (k, i), where k ∈ K represents
the type of the voters being served, and i ∈ {1, · · · ,m (k)} represents the serving infome-
diary. The population of the voters in market segment (k, i) is ρ (k, i), where ρ (k, i) > 0
and
∑m(k)
i=1 ρ (k, i) = q (k). The functions m and ρ are symmetric, i.e., m (k) = m (−k)
and ρ (k, i) = ρ (−k, i) for any k ∈ K and i = 1, · · · ,m (k), and they are taken as given
throughout this appendix.
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For any given symmetric policy profile a = 〈−a, a〉 with a ≥ 0, the news signal for market
segment (k, i) maximizes the expected utilities of the voters therein as in the standard RI
model:
max
Π
V (Π; a, k)− λ · I (Π) .
Across market segments, we consider all joint news distributions that are symmetric and
consistent with the marginal news distributions that solve the above problem (hereafter, c-
consistency). As in Appendix A.1, we can represent a joint news distribution by its matrix
form and define the c-consistency of the news configuration. This exercise is omitted for
brevity’s sake.
We examine the policy polarization effect of introducing competition between infome-
diaries. To facilitate comparison between monopolistic personalized news, we redefine p-
consistency by first forming market segments using functions m and ρ and then restricting
the same type of voters to receiving the same voting recommendation. By Lemma 6, equi-
librium policies are fully determined by (1) S ∈ {c, p}, which pins down marginal news
distributions, (2) the news configuration χ, and (3) the functions m and ρ. Hereafter we
shall use ES,χ,m,ρ to denote the equilibrium policy set and aS,χ,m,ρ to denote the policy
polarization.
The next proposition prescribes sufficient conditions for competition to reduce policy
polarization.
Proposition 7. Fix any functions m and ρ as above, and assume Assumptions 1-4 for
S ∈ {c, p}. Then Ec,χ,m,ρ = [0, ac,χ,m,ρ] ( Ep,χ′,m,ρ =
[
0, ap,χ
′,m,ρ
]
for any c-consistent
news configuration χ and p-consistent news configuration χ′ such that χ  χ′.
Proof. See Appendix E.3.
Two forces are acting in the same direction. First, competitive news signals maximize
voters’ expected utilities rather than their attention and are therefore less Blackwell infor-
mative than monopolistic personalized news. As infomediaries stop overfeeding voters with
information about the valence state, voters become more susceptible to policy deviations,
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so a reduction in policy polarization ensues. Second, competition reduces the correlation
of news signals between (the same type of) voters compared to monopolistic personalized
news, and the resulting policy polarization effect is negative by Proposition 4.
C General state distribution
This appendix investigates an extension to general state distributions. In the general envi-
ronment laid out in Appendix A, suppose the valence state is a distributed on R according
to a c.d.f. G that is absolute continuous and symmetric around zero.34 A news signal is
a mapping Π : R → ∆ (Z), where each Π (· | ω) specifies a probability distribution over a
finite set Z of signal realizations when the state realization is ω ∈ R. Under signal structure
Π,
piz =
∫
ω∈R
Π (z | ω) dG (ω)
is the probability that the signal realization is z ∈ Z. Assume w.l.o.g. that piz > 0 for any
z ∈ Z. Then
µz =
∫
ω∈R
ωΠ (z | ω) dG (ω) /piz
is the posterior mean of the state conditional on the signal realization being z ∈ Z. The
next assumption is adapted from Mateˇjka and McKay (2015).
Assumption 6. The needed attention for consuming Π : R→ ∆ (Z) is
I (Π) = H (G)− EΠ [H (G (· | z))]
where H (G) is the entropy of the valence state, and H (G (· | z)) is the conditional entropy
of the valence state given signal realization z.
In what follows, we will fix any symmetric policy profile 〈−a, a〉 with a > 0 and use
ΠS (a, k) to denote any news signal consumed by type k voters under segmentation tech-
34Results below hold for both continuous and discrete Gs. ω is the differential valence between the two
candidates expressed in terms of voters’ utilities, so it is by definition a real-valued random variable.
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nology S ∈ {b, p}. In the case of S = b, we will drop the notation k and simply write
Πb (a). For each ΠS (a, k), we will use ZS (a, k) to denote the set of signal realizations,
and µSz (a, k) to denote the posterior mean of the state conditional on the signal realization
being z ∈ ZS (a, k). The next proposition extends Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 to general state
distributions.
Proposition 8. Fix any symmetric policy profile 〈−a, a〉 with a > 0, and assume Assump-
tions 3 and 6. Then,
(i) any optimal personalized signal Πp (a, k) that is nondegenerate and makes type k vot-
ers’ participation constraint binding must satisfy |Zp (a, k) | = 2, (SOB) and the skew-
ness properties stated in Theorem 1(ii);
(ii) any optimal broadcast signal Πb (a) that is nondegenerate, induces consumption from
all voters and makes some voter’s participation constraint binding must satisfy |Zb (a) | ∈
{2, 3}:
(a) if |Zb (a) | = 2, then Πb (a) satisfies (SOB) and the skewness properties stated in
Theorem 1(i);
(b) if |Zb (a) | = 3, then we can write Zb (a) = {LL,LR,RR}, where µbLL (a) < 0,
µbLR (a) = 0 and µ
b
RR (a) = −µbLL (a) > 0. Also for any k ∈ K, we must have
v (a, k)+µbLL (a) < 0, sgn
(
v (a, k) + µbLR (a)
)
= sgn (k) and v (a, k)+µbRR (a) > 0.
Proof. See Appendix E.3.
D Completing Example 1
This appendix covers the case where opposition voters are disciplining, i.e., Condition (∗)
holds, and so Condition (∗∗) becomes |t (−1) | > |µbL| − |µpL (−1) |. As depicted in Figure
4, the last condition holds when extreme voters’ policy preference t (1) takes sufficiently
large values. As t (1) increases, left-wing voters seek a bigger occasional surprise from news
consumption than before, so µpR (−1) must increase. Also since they find news consumption
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less useful, |µpL (−1) | must decrease to prevent them from tuning out. Meanwhile in the
broadcast case, |µbL| (= µbR) must decrease to prevent extreme voters from tuning out.
Thus for sufficiently large t (1)s, the right-hand side of Condition (∗∗) is small whereas the
left-hand side is big, which explains the pattern depicted in Figure 4.
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6
t(1)
λ
Condition (*) and 
 assumption 2 hold
Condition (**) holds
Figure 4: Condition (∗∗): u (a, k) = −|t (k)−a|, entropy attention cost, Condition (∗) holds
and so opposition voters are disciplining in the personalized case.
E Mathematical proofs
E.1 Omitted proofs from Section 3
This appendix proves the results of Section 3 in the general environment laid out in Ap-
pendix A. The analysis takes an arbitrary symmetric policy profile a = 〈−a, a〉 with a ≥ 0
as given. Since the state is binary, it is without loss to identify a signal realization z
with the posterior mean µz of the state induced by z. A signal structure is then a profile
〈µz, piz〉z∈Z of posterior mean µzs and their probability pizs, and it must satisfy plausibility
(BP):
∑
z∈Z pizµz = 0.
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As we have already discussed in Footnote 17, it is without loss to identify a binary signal
with 〈µL, µR〉. Type k voters’ expected utility gain from consuming 〈µL, µR〉 equals
V (〈µL, µR〉; a, k) =

piR [v (a, k) + µR]
+ if k ≤ 0,
−piL [v (a, k) + µL]− if k > 0,
(2)
where
piL =
µR
µR − µL and piR = −
µL
µR − µL . (3)
Proof of Lemmas 1 and 2 We prove Lemmas 1 and 2 together in three steps.
Step 1. Show that the optimal personalized signal for any type k voter is unique and has
at most two realizations. An optimal personalized signal for type k voter solves
max
Z,Π:Ω→∆(Z)
I (Π) subject to V (Π; a, k) ≥ λI (Π) . (4)
Let γ ≥ 0 denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with voter k’s participation constraint,
and write the complementary slackness constraints as
γ ≥ 0, V (Π; a, k) ≥ λI (Π) , and γ [V (Π; a, k)− λI (Π)] = 0. (5)
If γ = 0, then the solution to (4) is the true state and so is unique and binary. If γ > 0,
then reformulate (4) as
max
Z,〈µz ,µz〉z∈Z ,γ≥0
∑
z∈Z
piz [ν (µz; a, k)− λ (γ)h (µz)] subject to (BP) and (5) (6)
where λ (γ) := λ − 1/γ. Note that the objective function of (6) is posterior separable,
and the solution to (6) is the true state if λ (γ) ≤ 0. If λ (γ) > 0, then ν (µ; a, k) −
λ (γ)h (µ) is the maximum of two strictly concave functions of µ: (i) −λ (γ)h (µ), and (ii)
v (a, k) + µ− λ (γ)h (µ) if k ≤ 0 and −v (a, k)− µ− λ (γ)h (µ) if k > 0. Since (i) and (ii)
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single-cross at µ = −v (a, k), their maximum is M-shaped, so applying the concavification
method developed by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) yields a unique solution with two
signal realizations. Given this, we can restrict Z to Z : |Z| ≤ 2 in (4) and prove that a
solution to (4) exists. To prove that the solution to (4) is unique, it suffices to show that γ
is unique in the case where γ > 0 and λ (γ) > 0. If the contrary were true, then take two
distinct Lagrange multipliers γ1 > γ2 > 0 for the voter’s participation constraint. For each
i = 1, 2, write λi = λ− 1/γi and Πi for the unique solution to (6). From strict optimality,
i.e., the voter strictly prefers Πi to Π−i when the attention cost parameter in (6) is given by
λi, we deduce that λ1 (I (Π1)− I (Π2)) > V (Π1; a, k)− V (Π2; a, k) > λ2 (I (Π1)− I (Π2)).
Thus, I (Π1) > I (Π2), so Π1 and Π2 cannot both be the solutions to (4), a contradiction.
Step 2. Show that any optimal broadcast signal has at most two realizations. An optimal
broadcast signal solves
max
Z,Π:Ω→∆(Z)
I (Π)
∑
k∈K:V (Π;a,k)≥λ·I(Π)
qk. (7)
For any solution to (7), let BS denote the set of voters with either binding or slack partici-
pation constraints, and note that BS 6= ∅. Since v (a, k) is increasing in k by Assumption 3
increasing differences, voters’ expected utility gain V (Π; a, k) from consuming any news
signal Π is increasing in k on {k ∈ K : k ≤ 0} and is decreasing in k on {k ∈ K : k ≥ 0}. In-
deed, we can strengthen “increasing” to “strictly increasing” and “decreasing” to “strictly
decreasing” in the above statement, because if two adjacent types of voters derive the same
utility from consuming Π, then they can be treated as a single entity. Given this, we can
write BS as {k ∈ K : k1 ≤ k ≤ k2}, where k1 ≤ 0 ≤ k2. Among the voters in BS, only k1
and k2 can have binding participation constraints.
Let γ1 ≥ 0 and γ2 ≥ 0 denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with k1 and k2’s
participation constraints, respectively, and let B ⊆ {k1, k2} denote the set of voters with
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binding participation constraints. Write the complementary slackness constraints as
γi ≥ 0, V (Π; a, ki) ≥ λI (Π) , and γi [V (Π; a, ki)− λI (Π)] = 0, (8)
and reformulate (7) as
max
Z,Π:Ω→∆(Z)
k1≤0≤k2,γ1,γ2≥0
I (Π)
k2∑
k=k1
qk +
2∑
i=1
γi [V (Π; a, ki)− λI (Π)] subject to (8). (9)
Consider three cases. First, if B = ∅, then the solution to (9) is the true state. Second,
if |B| = 1, then the solution to (9) is the optimal personalized signal for the voter in B.
Finally, if |B| = 2, then (9) becomes
max
Z,〈piz ,µz〉z∈Z
k1≤0≤k2,γ1,γ2≥0
∑
z∈Z
pizf (µz) subject to (BP) and (8) (10)
where
f (µz) =
∑
i=1,2
γi
γ1 + γ2
ν (µz; a, ki)−
(
λ−
∑k2
k=k1
qk
γ1 + γ2
)
h (µz) .
Write γ˜i =
γi
γ1+γ2
for i = 1, 2, Q for
∑k2
k=k1
qk, and λ˜ for λ− Qγ1+γ2 . Note that the solution to
(10) is the true state if λ˜ ≤ 0. If λ˜ > 0, then f (µz) is the maximum of three strictly concave
functions of µ: (i) γ˜1 [v (a, k1) + µ] − λ˜h (µ), (ii) −λ˜h (µ) and (iii) −γ˜2 [v (a, k2) + µ] −
λ˜h (µ), where (i) and (ii) intersect at µ = −v (a, k1) > 0, whereas (ii) and (iii) intersect
at µ = −v (a, k2) < 0. Let f+ denote the concave closure of f , and note that µ1 :=
inf {µ : f+ (µ) > f (µ)} and µ2 := sup {µ : f+ (µ) > f (µ)} exist and satisfy µ1 < 0 < µ2.
If f+ (0) cannot be expressed as a convex combination of f+ (µ1) and f
+ (µ2), then (10)
has a unique degenerate solution. If f+ (0) can be expressed as a convex combination of
f+ (µ1) and f
+ (µ2), then among all solution(s) to (10), the binary signal 〈µ1, µ2〉 is the most
Blackwell informative and hence constitutes the unique solution to the original attention
maximization problem. Taken together, we can restrict Z to Z : |Z| ≤ 2 in (7) and prove
that a solution (7) exists. This completes the proof.
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Step 3. Show that in the broadcast case, if it is optimal to induce news consumption from
all voters using a binary signal, then the optimal signal is unique and symmetric.
By assumption, we have k1 = −K and k2 = K, so B ⊆ {−K,K}. If B = ∅, then the
solution to (9) is the true state and so is unique and symmetric. The case where |B| = 1
is impossible, because in that case, the solution to (9) is the optimal personalized signal
for the voter in B, which violates the participation constraint of the voter in {−K,K}−B.
Finally, if B = {−K,K}, then take any optimal broadcast signal 〈µL, µR〉, and notice that
V (〈µL, µR〉; a,−K) = λI (〈µL, µR〉) = V (〈µL, µR〉; a,K) > 0. Simplifying using (2) and
v (a,K) = −v (a,−K) yields µL+µR = 0, so 〈µL, µR〉 is symmetric, and µL is a solution to
max
µ∈[−1,0]
h (µ) s.t.
1
2
[v (a,−K)− µ]+ ≥ λh (µ) . (11)
Since h is strictly convex and strictly decreasing on [−1, 0], (11) either admits no solution
(in which case the optimal signal isn’t binary to begin with) or admits a unique solution.
Proof of Theorem 1 We focus on the proof of Part (ii), which concerns the skewness
of personalized signals. Part (i) on the symmetry of the broadcast signal has already been
shown in the proof of Lemmas 1 and 2. Part (iii) on the needed attention for consuming
broadcast and personalized signals requires no more proof than the verbal argument offered
in the main text.
We only prove Part (ii) for an arbitrary left-wing voter k < 0, for whom we write
v (a, k) = v and note that v < 0. Let 〈µL, µR〉 denote the voter’s optimal personalized signal,
which, by Assumption 2, must satisfy V (〈µL, µR〉; a, k) = −µL [v + µR]+ / (µR − µL) ≥
λI (〈µL, µR〉) > 0 and so v + µR > 0. We wish to demonstrate that µL + µR > 0. Notice
first that µL + µR ≥ 0, because if the contrary were true, i.e., µL + µR < 0, then the voter
would strictly prefer 〈−µR,−µL〉 to 〈µL, µR〉:
V (〈−µR,−µL〉; a, k) = µR
µR − µL (v − µL) > −
µL
µR − µL (v + µR) = V (〈µL, µR〉; a, k) .
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It remains to show that µL + µR 6= 0. To this end, consider the following relaxed problem
of (6):
max
〈µL,µR〉∈[−1,0]×[0,1]
−µL
µR − µL [v + µR]
+ − (λ− 1/γ)
[
µR
µR − µLh (µL) +
−µL
µR − µLh (µR)
]
where γ > 0 denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the voter’s participation
constraint. Note that λ− 1/γ > 0 must hold in order for this problem to admit an interior
solution (as required by Assumption 2), and any interior solution must satisfy the following
first-order conditions:
v + µR = (λ− 1/γ)
[
∆h− h′ (µL) ∆µ
]
and − (v + µL) = (λ− 1/γ)
[
h′ (µR) ∆µ−∆h
]
where ∆h := h (µR) − h (µL) and ∆µ := µR − µL. If µL + µR = 0, then ∆h = 0 and
h′ (µR) = −h′ (µL) by Assumption 1, so the right-hand sides of the first-order conditions
are the same. Meanwhile, the left-hand sides differ, which leads to a contradiction.
E.2 Omitted proofs from Appendix A
E.2.1 Useful lemmas and their proofs
Proof of Lemma 6 Fix any personalization technology S, symmetric policy profile
〈−a, a〉 with a ≥ 0, 〈S, a〉-consistent news distribution 〈χ,b+,b−〉 and population function
q. Let q denote the |K|-column vector that compiles the populations of voters −K, · · · ,K.
Let the default be the strictly obedient outcome induced by the joint news distribution.
Define two matrix operations. First, for any C ⊆ K, let χC be the resulting matrix
from replacing every row k ∈ C of χ with a row of all ones. Second, for any matrix
A, let Â be the resulting matrix from rounding the entries of A, i.e., replacing entries
above 1/2 with 1 and those below 1/2 with zero. By definition, the row vector q̂>χ com-
piles candidate R’s default winning probabilities across the voting recommendation profiles
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that occur with strictly positive probabilities, and (q̂>χb+ + q̂>χb−)/2 is candidate R’s
default winning probability in expectation. After candidate R commits a unilateral devi-
ation from 〈−a, a〉 that attracts a set C ⊆ K of voters without affecting anything else, his
winning probability vector becomes q̂>χC , and his expected winning probability becomes
(q̂>χCb+ + q̂>χCb−)/2. Since q̂>χC ≥ q̂>χ, the above deviation strictly increases can-
didate R’s winning probability in expectation if and only if it does so under some voting
recommendation profile, i.e., (q̂>χCb+ + q̂>χCb−)/2 > (q̂>χb+ + q̂>χb−)/2 if and only
if q̂>χC 6= q̂>χ. The last condition is equivalent to C being an influential coalition, and it
depends on S, 〈−a, a〉, 〈χ,b+,b−〉 and q only through 〈χ, q〉.
Proof of Lemma 7 Fix any personalization technology S, symmetric policy profile
〈−a, a〉 with a ≥ 0, 〈S, a〉-consistent news distribution 〈χ,b+,b−〉 and population func-
tion q. Let Cs denote the influential coalitions formed under 〈χ, q〉. Consider any unilateral
deviation of candidate R from 〈−a, a〉 to a′. Below we demonstrate that a′ is unprofitable if
and only if (i) a′ /∈ [−a, a], or (ii) a′ ∈ [−a, a) and it doesn’t attract any influential coalition
whose members have ideological bliss points in [−a, a].
Step 1. Show that no a′ > a strictly increases candidate R’s winning probability. Fix any
a′ > a, and note that no type k ≤ 0 voter finds a′ attractive by Assumption 3:
v
(−a, a′, k)+ µSL (a, k) < v (−a, a, k) + µSL (a, k) (inverted V-shape)
≤ v (−a, a, 0) + µSL (a, k) (increasing differences)
= 0 + µSL (a, k) (symmetry)
< 0.
Given this, as well as the symmetry of the joint news distribution, it suffices to show that
if a′ attracts any type k > 0 voter, then it must repel type −k voters, i.e.,
v
(−a, a′, k)+ µSL (a, k) > 0 =⇒ v (−a, a′,−k)+ µSR (a,−k) < 0.
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The argument below exploits the symmetry of marginal news distributions, i.e., µSR (a,−k) =
−µSL (a, k), which together with Assumption 3 symmetry implies
v
(−a, a′,−k)+ µSR (a,−k) = u (a′,−k)− u (−a,−k) + µSR (a,−k)
= u
(−a′, k)− u (a, k)− µSL (a, k) .
Thus, if v (−a, a′, k) + µSL (a, k) = u (a′, k)− u (−a, k) + µSL (a, k) > 0, then
v
(−a, a′,−k)+ µSR (a,−k) = u (−a′, k)− u (a, k)− µSL (a, k)
< u
(
a′, k
)
+ u
(−a′, k)− [u (a, k) + u (−a, k)] ≤ 0,
where the last inequality follows from Assumption 3 concavity.
Step 2. Show that no a′ < −a strictly increases candidate R’s winning probability. The
proof closely parallels that offered in Step 1. For any a′ < a, notice first that it doesn’t
attract any type k ≥ 0 voter by Assumption 3 inverted V-shape:
v
(−a, a′, k)+ µpL (a, k) < v (−a,−a, k) + µpL (a, k) = 0 + µpL (a, k) < 0.
Second, if a′ attracts any type k < 0 voter, then it must repel type −k voters for the same
reason given in Step 1. Combining these observations gives the desired result.
Step 3. Show that no a′ ∈ [−a, a) repels any voter. Fix any a′ ∈ [−a, a). From Assump-
tion 3 inverted V-shape and (SOB), it follows that if t (k) ≤ a′, then
v
(−a, a′, k)+ µSR (a, k) > v (−a, a, k) + µSR (a, k) > 0,
and if t (k) > a′, then
v
(−a, a′, k)+ µSR (a, k) ≥ v (−a,−a, k) + µSR (a, k) = 0 + µSR (a, k) > 0.
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Combining these observations yields v (−a, a′, k) + µSR (a, k) > 0 for any k.
Step 4. Show that no a′ ∈ [−a, a) attracts any voter whose bliss point lies outside [−a, a].
Fix any a′ ∈ [−a, a). From Assumption 3 inverted V-shape and (SOB), we deduce that
if t (k) ≤ −a, then
v
(−a, a′, k)+ µSL (a, k) ≤ v (−a,−a, k) + µSL (a, k) = 0 + µSL (a, k) < 0,
and if t (k) > a, then
v
(−a, a′, k)+ µSL (a, k) < v (−a, a, k) + µSL (a, k) < 0.
Combining these observations yields v (−a, a′, k) + µSL (a, k) < 0 for any k.
Steps 1-4 together show that 〈−a, a〉 can arise in equilibrium if and only if no unilateral
deviation of candidate R from 〈−a, a〉 to any a′ ∈ [−a, a) attracts any influential coalition
whose members have ideological bliss points in [−a, a], thus completing the proof.
The next lemma gives characterizations of the D-proof set for any D ⊆ K.
Lemma 9. Let everything be as in Theorem 3. Then for any k ∈ {0, · · · ,K} and any
D ⊆ {−k, · · · , k} such that D ∩ {−k, k} 6= ∅, we must have ξS (D) > t (k) and [t (k) , a] ∩
ΞS (D) = [t (k) , ξS (D)].
Proof. Let k and D be as above. Recall the definition of the D-proof set:
ΞS (D) :=
{
a ≥ 0 : max
a′∈A
φS
(−a, a′,D) ≤ 0}
where φS (−a, a′,D) := min
k′∈D
φS
(−a, a′, k′) is the D-susceptibility to candidate R’s deviation
from 〈−a, a〉 to a′. By Assumption 3 inverted V-shape, we can restrict attention to
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a′ ∈ [min t (D) ,max t (D)] := D˜, i.e.,
ΞS (D) =
{
a ≥ 0 : max
a′∈D˜
φS
(−a, a′,D) ≤ 0}
where t (D) denotes the image of D under the mapping t.
Fix the policy profile to be 〈−t (k) , t (k)〉, and take any a′ ∈ D˜. From Assumption 3
and (SOB), we deduce that a′ doesn’t attract type k voters:
φS
(−t (k) , a′, k) := v (−t (k) , a′, k)+ µSL (t (k) , k)
≤ v (−t (k) , t (k) , k) + µSL (t (k) , k) (inverted V-shape)
< 0, (SOB)
and it doesn’t attract type −k voters, either:
φS
(−t (k) , a′,−k)
:= v
(−t (k) , a′,−k)+ µSL (t (k) ,−k)
≤ v (−t (k) , t (−k) ,−k) + µSL (t (k) ,−k) (inverted V-shape)
= 0 + µSL (t (k) ,−k) (symmetry)
< 0.
Thus φS (−t (k) , a′,D) := min
k′∈D
φS
(−t (k) , a′, k′) < 0, and taking maximum over a′ yields
max
a′∈D˜
φS
(−t (k) , a′,D) < 0. Meanwhile, Assumption 4 implies that φS (−a, a′,D) is increas-
ing in a on [t (k) , a] for any a′. Taking maximum over a′ yields
max
a′∈D˜
φS
(−a1, a′,D) < φS (−a2, arg max
a′∈D˜
φS
(−a1, a′,D) ,D) ≤ max
a′∈D˜
φS
(−a2, a′,D)
for any a2 > a1 ≥ t (k), so max
a′∈D˜
φS
(−a, a′,D) is increasing in a on [t (k) , a]. Taken together,
62
we obtain that D’s policy latitude exceeds t (k):
ξS (D) := max ΞS (D) = max
{
a ≥ 0 : max
a′∈D˜
φS
(−a, a′,D) ≤ 0} > t (k)
and all policies in
[
t (k) , ξS (D)] belong to the D-proof set:
[t (k) , a] ∩ ΞS (D) =
{
a ≥ t (k) : max
a′∈D˜
φS
(−a, a′,D) ≤ 0} = [t (k) , ξS (D)] .
The next lemma characterizes the susceptibility function for the case of personalized
news and quadratic attention cost.
Lemma 10. Under Assumptions 1, 2(i), 3, and 5, the following hold for any a ≥ 0 and
a′ ∈ [−a, a].
(i) φp (−a, a′, ·) is decreasing on {k ∈ K : k ≤ 0} and is increasing on {k ∈ K : k ≥ 0}.
(ii) φp (−a, a′, k) ≤ φp (−a, a′,−k) for any k > 0.
Proof. Let a and a′ be as above. Tedious algebra (available upon request) reduces Assump-
tion 2(i) to 2λ > 1 and 4λv (−a, a,K) < 1, under which
µpL (a, k) =

−2v (−a, a, k)− 1/ (2λ) if k ≤ 0,
−1/ (2λ) if k > 0.
(12)
Also recall that φp (−a, a′, k) := v (−a, a′, k) + µpL (a, k).
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Part (i): If k ≤ 0, then
φp
(−a, a′, k) = v (−a, a′, k)− 2v (−a, a, k)− 1
2λ
= u
(
a′, k
)− u (−a, k)− 2 [u (a, k)− u (−a, k)]− 1
2λ
= u
(
a′, k
)
+ u (−a, k)− 2u (a, k)− 1
2λ
= − [v (a′, a, k)+ v (−a, a, k)]− 1
2λ
where the last line is decreasing in k by Assumption 3 increasing differences. If k > 0,
then φp (−a, a′, k) = v (−a, a′, k)− 1/ (2λ) and so is increasing in k.
Part (ii): Under Assumption 3, the following holds for any k > 0:
φp
(−a, a′, k)− φp (−a, a′,−k)
= v
(−a, a′, k)− 1
2λ
−
[
v
(−a, a′,−k)− 2v (−a, a,−k)− 1
2λ
]
= v
(−a, a′, k)− v (a,−a′, k)− 2v (−a, a, k) (symmetry)
=
[
u (−a, k)− u (−a′, k)]− [u (a, k)− u (a′, k)]
= v
(
a′, a,−k)− v (a′, a, k) (symmetry)
≤ 0. (increasing differences)
Lemma 11. Under Assumptions 1-3, Assumption 4 holds if S = b or if S = p and either
u (a, k) = −|t (k)− a| or h (µ) = µ2.
Proof. We wish to verify that φS (−a, a′, k) := v (−a, a′, k) + µSL (a, k) is increasing in a on
[|t (k) |, a] for any k ∈ K and any a′ ∈ A in the above scenarios. Since v (−a, a′, k) is strictly
increasing in a on [|t (k) |, a] by Assumption 3 inverted V-shape, it suffices to show that
µSL (a, k) is nondecreasing in a on [|t (k) |, a].
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Case 1. S = b Recall that µbL (a) is the unique solution to
max
µ∈[−1,0]
h (µ) s.t.
1
2
[v (−a, a,−K)− µ]+ ≥ λh (µ)
where h is strictly convex and strictly decreasing on [−1, 0]. Meanwhile, the following holds
for any a′ > a ≥ 0 by Assumption 3:
v
(−a′, a′,−K)− v (−a, a,−K)
= u
(
a′,−K)− u (−a′,−K)− u (a,−K) + u (−a,−K)
= u
(
a′,−K)− u (a,−K)− [u (a′,K)− u (a,K)] (symmetry)
= v
(
a, a′,−K)− v (a, a′,K)
≤ 0, (increasing differences)
so v (−a, a,−K) is decreasing in a. Combining these observations gives the desired result.
Case 2. S = p and u (a, k) = −|t (k)− a| In this case, v (−a, a, k) is invariant with a on
[|t (k) |, a], so µpL (a, k) ≡ µpL (|t (k) |, k) on [|t (k) |, a].
Case 3. S = p and h (µ) = µ2 In this case, a careful inspection of (12) (i.e., the expression
for µpL (a, k)) gives the desired result.
E.2.2 Proofs of theorems and propositions
Proof of Theorem 3 Fix any personalization technology S ∈ {b, p}, S-consistent news
configuration χ and population function q. Let C denote a generic influential coalition
formed under 〈χ, q〉. For each k = 0, · · · ,K − 1, define
A (k) =

[t (k) , t (k + 1)) ∩
⋂
C⊆{−k,··· ,k}
ΞS (C) if ∃C ⊆ {−k, · · · , k},
[t (k) , t (k + 1)) otherwise.
65
Also define
A (K) = [t (K) , a] ∩
⋂
C
ΞS (C) .
Lemma 7 shows that
ES,χ,q =
K⋃
k=0
A (k) .
Below we prove by induction that ∪Kk=0A (k) =
[
0,min
C
ξS (C)
]
.
Step 0. Letting k = 0 in the statement of Lemma 9 yields ΞS ({0}) = [0, ξS ({0})], so
A (0) =

[
0, ξS ({0})] if {0} is influential and ξS ({0}) < t (1) ,
[0, t (1)) otherwise.
For the first case, note that A (k) ⊆ [t (k) , t (k + 1)] ∩ ΞS ({0}) = ∅ for any k ≥ 1,
and min
C
ξS (C) = ξS ({0}) because ξS (C) > t (1) for any C 6= {0} by Lemma 9. Taken
together, we obtain ∪Kk=0A (k) =
[
0,min
C
ξS (C)
]
and terminate the procedure. In the
second case, we proceed to the next step.
Step m. The output of Step m− 1 is ∪m−1k=0 A (k) = [0, t (m)). Then from Lemma 9, which
shows that [t (m) , a] ∩ ΞS (C) = [t (m) , ξS (C)] for any C ⊆ {−m, · · · ,m} such that
C ∩ {−m,m} 6= ∅, it follows that
∪mk=0A (k) =

[
0, min
C⊆{−m,··· ,m}
ξS (C)
]
if min
C⊆{−m,··· ,m}
ξS (C) < t (m+ 1) ,
[0, t (m+ 1)) otherwise.
For the first case, note that A (k) ⊆ [t (k) , t (k + 1)] ∩ ∩C⊆{−m,··· ,m}ξS (C) = ∅ for
any k ≥ m + 1 , and min
C
ξS (C) = min
C⊆{−m,··· ,m}
ξS (C) because ξS (C′) > t (m+ 1)
for any C′ * {−m, · · · ,m} by Lemma 9, Taken together, we obtain ∪Kk=0A (k) =[
0,min
C
ξS (C)
]
and terminate the procedure. In the second case, we proceed to the
next step.
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The above procedure terminates in at most K + 1 steps, and the output is always
∪Kk=0A (k) =
[
0,min
C
ξS (C)
]
.
Proof of Proposition 6 We wish to demonstrate that min
Cs formed under 〈χ,q〉
ξp (C) ≥
min
Cs formed under 〈χ,q′〉
ξp (C) holds for any p-consistent χ and any two population functions q
and q′ such that q SOSD q′. The proof below exploits the following consequences of
Lemma 10: for any a ≥ 0 and a′ ∈ [−a, a], (i) φp (−a, a′,−K) = max
k∈K
φp
(−a, a′, k), and (ii)
φp (−a, a′, k) is decreasing in k on {k : k ≤ 0} and is increasing in k on {k : k ≥ 0}.
Step 1. Show that ξp (D) > t (K) for any D ⊆ K. Fix any a′ ∈ [t (−K) , t (K)] and any
D ⊆ K, and notice two things. First,
φp
(−t (K) , a′,D)
:= min
k∈D
φp
(−t (K) , a′, k)
≤ max
k∈D
φp
(−t (K) , a′, k)
≤ φp (−t (K) , a′,−K) (Lemma 10)
≤ φp (−t (K) , t (−K) ,−K) (Assumption 3 inverted V-shape)
:= v (−t (K) , t (−K) ,K) + µpL (t (K) ,−K)
= 0 + µpL (t (K) ,−K) (Assumption 3 symmetry)
< 0.
Second, since φp (−a, a′, k) is increasing in a on [t (K) , a] for any k ∈ D by Lemma 11,
φp (−a, a′,D) := min
k∈D
φp
(−a, a′, k) is increasing in a on [t (K) , a], too. Taken together, we
obtain
ξp (D) := max
{
a ≥ 0 : max
a′∈[t(−K),t(K)]
φp
(−a, a′,D) ≤ 0}
= max
{
a ≥ t (K) : max
a′∈[t(−K),t(K)]
φp
(−a, a′,D) ≤ 0} .
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Step 2. There are three kinds of influential coalitions: (a) max C ≤ 0, (b) min C ≥ 0,
and (c) min C < 0 < max C. Consider case (a), and notice two things. First, the following
are equivalent for any a ≥ t (K) and any a′ ∈ [−a, a] by Lemma 10: (i) φp (−a, a′, C) ≤ 0,
(ii) φp (−a, a′,max C) ≤ 0, and (iii) φp (−a, a′, {k : k ≤ max C}) ≤ 0. Second, since C is
influential and C ⊆ {k : k ≤ max C}, {k : k ≤ max C} is influential, too. Combining these
observations yields
min
Cs formed under 〈χ,q〉
s.t. max C≤0
ξp (C) = min
Cs formed under 〈χ,q〉
s.t. C={k:k≤α},α≤0
ξp (C) , (13)
and a close inspection of (13) reveals two things. First,
ξp ({k : k ≤ α}) = max
{
a ≥ t (K) : max
a′∈[−t(K),t(K)]
φp
(−a, a′, {k : k ≤ α}) ≤ 0}
is increasing in α on {α : α ≤ 0} by Lemma 10. Second, every set {k : k ≤ α} with α < 0
is more likely to be influential under q′ than under q because q SOSD q′. Therefore,
min
Cs formed under 〈χ,q〉
s.t.C={k:k≤α},α≤0
ξp (C) ≥ min
Cs formed under 〈χ,q′〉
s.t. C={k:k≤α},α≤0
ξp (C) ,
which proves the desired result for case (a). The proofs for cases (b) and (c) are similar
and are therefore omitted for brevity’s sake.
E.3 Omitted proofs from Appendices B and C
Lemma 12. Fix any personalization technology S ∈ {b, p} and any symmetric policy profile
〈−a, a〉 with a ≥ 0. Assume Assumption 1. Then for any two marginal attention costs
λ′′ > λ′ > 0 such that the corresponding environments satisfy Assumption 2, the optimal
news signal consumed by any type k voter is more Blackwell informative when the marginal
attention cost equals λ′ than when it equals λ′′.
Proof. In the broadcast case, the optimal news signal is symmetric and so becomes less
68
Blackwell informative as λ increases. For the personalized case, we only prove the result
for an arbitrary type k ≤ 0 voter, for whom we write v (a, k) = v and note that v ≤ 0.
Step 1. Suppose the infomediary maximizes the voter’s expected utility as in the standard
RI model. For the same reason given in the proof of Lemma 1, the solution to this problem
is unique and has at most two signal realizations. In the case where the solution is binary
and induces interior beliefs, the first-order conditions of utility maximization are
v + µR = λ
[
∆h− h′ (µL) ∆µ
]
(14)
and− (v + µL) = λ
[
h′ (µR) ∆µ−∆h
]
(15)
where ∆h := h (µR)− h (µL) and ∆µ := µR − µL. Summing up (14) and (15) yields
h′ (µR)− h′ (µL) = 1/λ, (16)
and using (16) when differentiating (15) with respect to λ yields
dµL
dλ
=∆h− h′ (µR) ∆µ
+ λ
[
h′ (µR)
dµR
dλ
− h′ (µL) dµL
dλ
− h′′ (µR) dµR
dλ
∆µ− h′ (µR) dµR
dλ
+ h′ (µR)
dµL
dλ
]
=∆h− h′ (µR) ∆µ− λh′′ (µR) dµR
dλ
∆µ+
dµL
dλ
.
Therefore,
dµR
dλ
=
∆h− h′ (µR) ∆µ
λh′′ (µR) ∆µ
< 0, (17)
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where the inequality holds because h is symmetric around zero, h′ > 0 on [0, 1], h′′ > 0,
and ∆µ > 0.35 Meanwhile, differentiating (16) with respect to λ yields
h′′ (µL)
dµL
dλ
= h′′ (µR)
dµR
dλ
+
1
λ2
,
and simplifying using (17) yields
dµL
dλ
=
∆h− h′ (µL) ∆µ
λh′′ (µL) ∆µ
> 0. (18)
Together, (17) and (18) imply that the utility-maximizing signal (hereafter denoted by
Πc (a, k, λ)) becomes less Blackwell informative as λ increases.
Step 2. Write type k voter’s optimal personalized signal as Πp (a, k, λ) in order to make
its dependence on λ explicit. Recall that Πp (a, k, λ) = Πc (a, k, λ− 1/γ (γ)) for some 0 <
γ (λ) < 1/λ. Write β (λ) = λ − 1/γ (λ). If we can show that β (λ′′) > β (λ′) for any
λ′′ > λ′ > 0 that satisfy Assumption 2, then Πp (a, k, λ′) is more Blackwell informative than
Πp (a, k, λ′′) by Step 1.
Suppose to the contrary that β (λ′′) ≤ β (λ′) for some λ′′ > λ′ > 0 as above. Write
Πp (a, k, λ′) = Π′ and Πp (a, k, λ′′) = Π′′, and note that Π′ and Π′′ are nondegenerate and
induce interior beliefs by assumption. From Step 1, we deduce that if β (λ′′) < β (λ′), then
Π′′ is more Blackwell informative than Π′, so in particular I (Π′′) > I (Π′) > 0. Then from
V (Π′; a, k) = λ′I (Π′) and V (Π′′; a, k) = λ′′I (Π′′), it follows that V (Π′′; a, k)− λ′I (Π′′) >
0 = V (Π′; a, k) − λ′I (Π′) , which coupled with I (Π′′) > I (Π′) implies that Π′ is not
optimal when λ = λ′, a contradiction. Meanwhile, if β (λ′) = β (λ′′), then Π′ = Π′′ and so
V (Π′; a, k) = λ′I (Π′) < λ′′I (Π′′) = V (Π′′; a, k), a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 7 Since the optimal personalized signal for any voter is more
Blackwell informative than his competitive signal (Lemma 12), the following holds for any
35For readers interested in the algebra, note that ∆h − h′ (µR) ∆µ = h (µR) − h (|µL|) − h′ (µR) ∆µ <
h′ (µR) (µR − |µL| −∆µ) = −2h′ (µR) |µL| < 0 if µR > |µL|(> 0), and h (µR) − h (|µL|) − h′ (µR) ∆µ ≤
−h′ (µR) ∆ < 0 if (0 <)µR ≤ |µL|.
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a ≥ 0, a′ and D ⊆ K:
φc
(−a, a′,D) := min
k∈D
φc
(−a, a′, k) := min
k∈D
v
(−a, a′, k)+ µcL (a, k)
> min
k∈D
v
(−a, a′, k)+ µpL (a, k) := φp (−a, a′,D) .
Letting S = c in the proof of Lemma 9 yields ξc (D) < ξp (D), where ξc (D) denotes D’s
policy latitude in the competitive case. Then for any c-consistent χ and p-consistent χ′
such that χ  χ′, we must have
Ec,χ,ρ =
[
0, min
Cs formed under 〈χ,ρ〉
ξc (C)
]
(Theorem 3; χ is c-consistent)
⊆
[
0, min
Cs formed under 〈χ′,ρ〉
ξc (C)
]
(Proposition 4; χ  χ′)
(
[
0, min
Cs formed under 〈χ′,ρ〉
ξp (C)
]
(ξc (C) < ξp (C))
= Ep,χ′,ρ, (Theorem 3; χ′ is p-consistent)
which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 8 Fix any a = 〈−a, a〉 with a > 0. As we have already demon-
strated in the proof of Lemma 1, it is without loss to strengthen Assumption 3 increasing
differences to strict increasing differences, i.e., v (a, k) is strictly increasing in k, because
if v (a, k) = v (a, k + 1) for some k, then we can treat type k and k + 1 voters as a single
entity.
Part (i): For any type k voter, any optimal personalized signal that is nondegenerate and
makes his participation constraint binding (let γ (k) > 0 denote the corresponding Lagrange
multiplier) solves
max
Z,Π:R→∆(Z)
V (Π; a, k)− (λ− 1/γ (k)) I (Π) , (19)
where λ (k) := λ − 1/γ (k) > 0 must hold in order to satisfy γ (k) > 0. By Mateˇjka
and McKay (2015), any nondegenerate solution to (19) must be binary and, hence, satisfy
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(SOB). Take any such solution, and let L (k) denote the likelihood that the voter votes for
R rather than L. Below we demonstrate that L (k) < 1 if k < 0, L (k) = 1 if k = 0 and
L (k) > 1 if k > 0, which together with Bayes’ plausibility implies the skewness properties
stated in Theorem 1(ii).
By Mateˇjka and McKay (2015), the probability that voter k votes for R in state ω equals
L (k) exp
(
v(a,k)+ω
λ(k)
)
L (k) exp
(
v(a,k)+ω
λ(k)
)
+ 1
. (20)
Thus for any given λ (k) > 0, (19) is equivalent to
max
L∈[0,+∞)
EG
(v (a, k) + ω) L exp
(
v(a,k)+ω
λ(k)
)
L exp
(
v(a,k)+ω
λ(k)
)
+ 1
− λ (k) I (L) ,
where I (L) denotes the mutual information of the valence state and the voting decision
made based on L and (20). Since the objective function has strict increasing differences in
(L, v (a, k)), L (k) must be increasing in k. Combining this with L (k) = 1 if and only if
k = 0 (verified below), or equivalently v (a, k) = 0, gives the desired result.
To verify the last statement, we write v˜ for v (a, k) /λ (k), ω˜ for ω/λ (k), and L for L (k).
Since G is symmetric around zero, L = 1 if and only if
∫ ∞
0
exp (ω˜ + v˜)
exp (ω˜ + v˜) + 1
+
exp (−ω˜ + v˜)
exp (−ω˜ + v˜) + 1dG (ω) =
1
2
. (21)
A close inspection of (21) reveals that its the left-hand side is strictly increasing in v˜, so we
only need to verify that (21) holds for v˜ = 0. This is indeed the case, since
∫ ∞
0
exp (ω˜)
exp (ω˜) + 1
+
exp (−ω˜)
exp (−ω˜) + 1dG (ω) =
∫ ∞
0
exp (ω˜)
exp (ω˜) + 1
+
1
exp (ω˜) + 1
dG (ω) =
1
2
.
Part (ii): Take any optimal broadcast signal that induces consumption from all voters, and
let B 6= ∅ denote the set of voters with binding participation constraints. Since v (a, k) is
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strictly increasing in k, we must have B ⊆ {−K,K} and, indeed, B = {−K,K}, because if
B ( {−K,K}, then the signal coincides with the optimal personalized signal for the voter
in B and so violates the participation constraint of voter k ∈ {−K,K} − B.
For each k ∈ B, let γ (k) > 0 denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with voter k’s
participation constraint. As demonstrated in the proof of Lemma 1, we can reformulate the
infomediary’s problem as
max
Z,Π:R→∆(Z)
∑
k∈B
γ (k)∑
k∈B γ (K)
V (Π; a, k)−
(
λ− 1∑
k∈B γ (k)
)
I (Π) , (22)
where λ − 1∑
k∈B γ(k)
> 0 must hold in order to satisfy γ (k) > 0 for all k ∈ B. A careful
inspection of (22) reduces it to the same kind of the optimal information acquisition problem
studied by Mateˇjka and McKay (2015), whereby a representative voter makes three decisions
LL, LR and RR on behalf of the voters in B (the first and second letters stand for the
voting recommendation to type −K and K voters, respectively) and pays an information
acquisition cost that is proportional to the mutual information of the valence state and
voting decision. By Mateˇjka and McKay (2015), any solution Π : Ω→ ∆ (Z) to (22) must
satisfy Z ⊆ {LL,LR,RR} and make the voters in B obey the voting recommendations
given to them (hereafter obedience).
Case 1. |Z| = 2 In this case, Z must equal {LL,RR}, and Π must induce strict obedience
from its consumers, i.e., v (a,−K) + µLL > 0 and v (a,K) + µRR < 0. To show that Π is
symmetric, i.e., Π (LL | ω) = Π (RR | −ω) a.e., suppose the contrary is true, and consider
a new signal structure Π′ : Ω→ ∆(Z) where Π′ (LL | ω) = Π (RR | −ω) for all ω. For each
z ∈ Z, write pi′z for
∫
Π′ (z | ω) dG (ω) and µ′z for
∫
ωΠ′ (z | ω) dG (ω) /pi′z, and note that
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pi′LL = piRR, pi
′
RR = piLL, µ
′
LL = −µRR, µ′RR = −µLL, and I (Π) = I (Π′). Therefore,
V
(
Π′; a,−K)
= pi′RR
[
v (a,−K) + µ′RR
]
= piLL [−v (a,K)− µLL]
= V (Π; a,K)
= λI (Π) (K ∈ B)
= V (Π; a,−K) , (−K ∈ B)
and V (Π′; a,K) = V (Π; a,K) can be shown analogously. So compared to Π (or Π′), the
signal structure 12Π +
1
2Π
′ generates the same utility of consumption to the representative
voter in (22) but incurs a strictly lower attention cost because I (Π) is strictly convex in its
argument (see, e.g., Theorem 2.7.4. of Cover and Thomas (2006)). Thus Π isn’t a solution
to (22), a contradiction.
Case 2. Z = {LL,LR,RR} In this case, the voters in B must strictly prefer to obey
the voting recommendations prescribed by LL and RR, and weakly prefer to obey the
voting recommendations prescribed by LR, i.e., v (a, k) + µLL < 0 < v (a, k) + µRR for all
k ∈ B, and v (a,−K) + µLR ≤ 0 ≤ v (a,K) + µLR. To show that Π is symmetric, i.e.,
Π (LL | ω) = Π (RR | −ω), Π (LR | ω) = Π (LR | −ω), and Π (RR | ω) = Π (LL | −ω) a.e.,
suppose the contrary is true, and consider a new signal structure Π′ : Ω → ∆ (Z) where
Π′ (LL | ω) = Π (RR | −ω), Π′ (LR | ω) = Π (LR | −ω), and Π′ (RR | ω) = Π (LL | −ω).
By construction, we have pi′LL = piRR, pi
′
LR = piLR, pi
′
RR = piLL, µ
′
LL = −µRR, µLR = −µ′LR,
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and µ′RR = −µLL. Combining this with obedience yields
v (a,−K) + µ′LL = −v (a,K)− µRR < 0
v (a,−K) + µ′LR = −v (a,K)− µLR ≤ 0
v (a,−K) + µ′RR = −v (a,K)− µLL > 0
v (a,K) + µ′LL = −v (a,−K)− µRR < 0
v (a,K) + µ′LR = −v (a,−K)− µLR ≥ 0
and v (a,K) + µ′RR = −v (a,−K)− µLL > 0,
so V (Π′; a,−K) = pi′RR [v (a,−K) + µ′RR] = piLL [−v (a,K)− µLL] = V (Π; a,K) = λI (Π) =
V (Π; a,−K), and V (Π′; a,K) = V (Π′; a,K) can be shown analogously. The remainder of
the proof is the same as that for case 1 and is therefore omitted for brevity’s sake.
E.4 Omitted proofs from Sections 4-6
The proofs presented in this appendix assume K = {−1, 0, 1} and u (a, k) = −|t (k)− a|, so
in particular
v (−a, a, k) =

−2a if t (k) < −a,
2t (k) if − a ≤ t (k) ≤ a,
2a if t (k) > a.
In the proof of Lemmas 1 and 2, letting v (−a, a, k) be invariant with a on [|t (k) |, a] yields
µbL (a) ≡ µbL (t (1)) := µbL on [t (1) , a], as well as µpL (a, k) ≡ µpL (|t (k) |, k) := µpL (k) on
[|t (k) |, a] for any k.
Proof of Lemma 5 Part (i): When proving Lemma 11, we already demonstrated that
µbL (a) is nondecreasing in a. In the current context, this implies that φ
b (−a, 0, 0) = a +
µbL (a) is strictly increasing in a. Then from φ
b (−a, 0, 0)
∣∣∣
a=0
= µbL (0) < 0, it follows
that ξb (0) := max
{
0 ≤ a ≤ a : φb (−a, 0, 0) ≤ 0} is the unique root of φb (−a, 0, 0) when
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a is large. If, in addition, ξb (0) ≥ t (1), then solving φb (−a, 0, 0) = 0 yields ξb (0) =
−µbL
(
ξb (0)
)
= −µbL.
Part (ii): For k = 1, notice that φp (−a, t (1) , 1) = a + t (1) + µpL (1) when a ≥ t (1),
and φp (−a, t (1) , 1)
∣∣∣
a=t(1)
= v (−t (1) , t (1) , 1) + µpL (t (1) , 1) < 0 by (SOB). Therefore,
ξp (1) := max {0 ≤ a ≤ a : φp (−a, t (1) , 1) ≤ 0} is the unique root of φp (−a, t (1) , 1), which
equals − [t (1) + µpL (1)] when a is large. The proofs for k = 0 and k = −1 are similar and
are therefore omitted for brevity’s sake.
Proof of Example 2 Let everything be as in the baseline model, except that extreme
voters abstain from news consumption and vote along party lines when they are indifferent
between the candidates. Take any symmetric policy profile 〈−a, a〉 with a ∈ [0, ξ], where
ξ := min
{
t (1) , ξS (0)
}
. Note that any unilateral deviation of candidate R from 〈−a, a〉
doesn’t attract median voters by assumption, and it cannot increase the total number of
votes that extreme voters cast to candidate R. Combining these observations gives the
desired result.
Proof of Example 3 Fix the policy profile to 〈−t (1) , t (1)〉. For each k ∈ {−1, 1},
write the posterior mean of the state conditional on type k voters’ signal realization being
z ∈ {L,M,R} as µz (k), where v (−t (1) , t (1) , k) + µL (k) < v (−t (1) , t (1) , k) + µM (k) =
0 < v (−t (1) , t (1) , k) + µR (k) by assumption. Combining this with Bayes’ plausibility
yields µL (k) < 0 < µR (k).
Consider any unilateral deviation of candidate R from 〈−t (1) , t (1)〉 to a′. Clearly,
no a′ /∈ [−t (1) , t (1)] constitutes a profitable deviation, and no a′ ∈ [−t (1) , t (1)] attracts
median voters because their policy latitude is assumed to be greater than t (1). It remains to
show that no a′ ∈ [−t (1) , t (1)) affects extreme voters’ voting decisions. To avoid repetition,
we only prove this result for k = −1 and omit the proof for k = −1. By Assumption 3, the
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following holds for z = L:
v
(−t (1) , a′,−1)+ µL (−1)
≤ v (−t (1) , t (−1) ,−1) + µL (−1) (inverted V-shape)
= v (−t (1) ,−t (1) ,−1) + µL (−1) (symmetry)
= 0 + µL (−1)
< 0,
and the following hold for z = M,R:
v
(−t (1) , a′,−1)+ µz (−1)
> v (−t (1) , t (1) ,−1) + µz (−1) (inverted V-shape)
≥ 0.
To complete the proof, suppose type−1 voters vote for candidateR when they are indifferent
between the two candidates, and we are done.
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